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Proportionality is conspicuously absent from the legal framework for
immigration sanctions. Immigration law relies on one sanction-
deportation-as the ubiquitous penalty for any immigration violation. Neither
the gravity of the violation nor the harm that results bears on whether
deportation is the consequence for an immigration violation. Immigration law
stands alone in the legal landscape in this respect. Criminal law incorporates
proportionality when imposing graduated punishment based on the gravity of
the offense; contract and tort law provide for damages that are graduated
based on the harm to others or to society.
This Article represents the first and fundamental step in a larger project
of articulating a proposed remedial scheme that would align immigration law
with the broader landscape of legal sanctions. It traces the history of
immigration sanctions, offering a historical perspective on the recent arrival of
deportation as the central immigration sanction. The Article takes a fresh
approach to remedying violations of immigration law, proposing a system of
graduated sanctions that would align immigration remedies with the
overarching goals of U.S. immigration law.
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. Introduction
Immigration law eschews proportionality. Proportionality is
conspicuously absent from the legal framework for immigration sanctions. One
sanction--deportation-is the ubiquitous penalty for any immigration
violation.' Neither the gravity of the violation nor the harm that results governs
whether deportation is the consequence for an immigration violation.2
Immigration law stands alone in the legal landscape in this respect.
1. See Juliet Stumpf, Penalizing Immigrants, 18 FED. SENT'G REP. 264, 264 (2006)





Proportionality, in contrast, is the touchstone of criminal punishment.3
The criminalization of immigration law has remapped the geography of
immigration law over the past twenty years. A wide assortment of graver and
lesser crimes now trigger deportation.4 More immigration violations now
constitute crimes, 5 and prosecution of immigration-related crimes has increased
greatly.6 Immigration law has become so tightly interwoven with criminal
3. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 287 (1983) ("[I]t is a precept ofjustice that
punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense... ." (quoting Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910))).
4. See 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2006) (defining "crime of violence" as an offense an element of
which is the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or
property of another, or a felony offense that involves the "substantial risk" of such force); Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (Drug Kingpin Act), Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7342, 102 Stat. 4181,
4469-70 (defining the "aggravated felony" deportability ground to include crimes of murder,
drug trafficking, and firearms trafficking); Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649,
§ 501(a)(3), 104 Stat. 4978,5048 (amending definition of"aggravated felony" to include "any
crime of violence"); Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-416, § 222, 108 Stat. 4305, 4320-22 (expanding the "aggravated felony" deportability
ground to include theft, trafficking in fraudulent documents, fraud, and tax evasion);
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, sec. 440,
§ 242(a)(2), 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2006)) (expanding
"aggravated felony" deportation ground to include nonviolent crimes of forgery, counterfeiting,
prostitution, certain gambling offenses, vehicle trafficking, obstruction of justice, perjury,
bribery of a witness, and offenses related to skipping bail).
5. See Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 § 101,8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f)
(2006) (criminalizing a pattern or practice of knowingly hiring, recruiting, or referring for a fee
an unauthorized alien for employment (§ 1324a(a)(1)(A)), or knowingly continuing to employ
an unauthorized alien (§ 1324a(a)(2))); § 1325(c) (making it a criminal offense for persons to
marry for purpose of evading immigration laws); § 1325(d) (outlining criminal penalties
imposed on those who establish commercial enterprises for purpose of evading immigration
laws); § 1326(b)(1) (making it a criminal offense for noncitizen misdemeanor offenders to
attempt to unlawfully re-enter the United States); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546-3009-
724 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18 U.S.C.) (expanding federal immigration
crimes to include driving above the speed limit while fleeing an immigration checkpoint,
knowingly failing to disclose role as preparer of false immigration application, knowingly
making a false claim of U.S. citizenship, and failing to cooperate in the execution of one's
removal order); see also Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law:
Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 469, 477-78
(2007) (noting that "[s]ince 1986, Congress has liberally expanded the list of immigration
offenses"); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power,
56 Am. U. L. REV. 367, 384 (2006) (describing civil immigration violations that have been
elevated to criminal offenses).
6. See Legomsky, supra note 5, at 479-80 (outlining the dramatic escalation in federal
prosecutions of immigration crimes from the 1980s to the present); Teresa Miller, Citizenship &
Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611,639
(2003) (detailing the increase, since the 1980s, in the number of noncitizens who face
punishment in the criminal justice system for crimes that were once only civil violations);
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justice norms as to constitute a distinct legal category,7 dubbed "crimmigration
law.
,8
Yet this transformation is incomplete in two respects. Others have deftly
addressed the first aspect: While the enforcement of immigration law has
imported substantive criminal law norms, it has left behind the procedural
protections of criminal law.9 Immigration proceedings do not trigger the
constitutional rights due to defendants in the criminal justice system: the right
to a trial by a court established under Article III of the Constitution,'0 the right
to counsel at government expense," the right not to incriminate oneself,
12
Stumpf, supra note 5, at 388 (noting that immigration prosecutions outnumber all other types of
federal criminal prosecutions).
7. See Nora V. Demleitner, Immigration Threats and Rewards: Effective Law
Enforcement Tools in the "War" on Terrorism?, 51 EMORY L.J. 1059, 1061-73 (2002)
(describing how immigration law has become a tool of the criminal justice system); Daniel
Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard
Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARv. L. REv. 1889, 1891 (2000) (noting the convergence between
immigration law and criminal justice); Legomsky, supra note 5, at 471-73 (detailing the points
of intersection between criminal justice and immigration control); Miller, supra note 6, at 613
(describing the intimacy between the criminal justice system and immigration law as the
"criminalization of immigration law"); Teresa A. Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between
Immigration and Crime Control After September 11th, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81, 82 (2005)
(stating that commentators have alternately described the changing relationship between
criminal justice and immigration law as the "'criminalization' of immigration law" and as a
"convergence between the criminal justice and deportation systems").
8. Stumpf, supra note 5, at 376.
9. See Legomsky, supra note 5, at 515-16 (listing constitutional procedural protections
that operate in criminal proceedings but not in deportation proceedings); Robert Pauw, A New
Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why at Least Some of the Constitution's Criminal
Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. REv. 305, 309-10 (2000) ("Courts have
generally held that the constitutional safeguards that apply in criminal prosecutions do not apply
in deportation proceedings."); Stumpf, supra note 5, at 390 (noting that immigration
proceedings have fewer constitutional protections than the criminal justice system provides);
Margaret Taylor & Ronald F. Wright, The Sentencing Judge as Immigration Judge, 51 EMORY
L.J. 1131, 1137 (2002).
10. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543-44 (1950)
(holding that no court has the authority to review a determination of the executive branch to
exclude an alien, unless expressly authorized by law); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S.
698, 713-14 (1893) (concluding that the executive branch may adjudicate the exclusion and
expulsion of aliens).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Vides-Vides v. INS, 783 F.2d 1463, 1469-70 (9th Cir.
1986) (finding that because deportation is a civil action, the Sixth Amendment right to
appointed counsel does not attach); United States v. Gasca-Kraft, 522 F.2d 149, 152 (9th Cir.
1975) (observing that courts have uniformly held that deportation proceedings are non-criminal
and that the subjects of such proceedings are not entitled to representation by counsel at
government expense); Burquez v. INS, 513 F.2d 751, 755 (10th Cir. 1975) ("There is no right to
appointed counsel in deportation proceedings.").
12. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 155 (1923)
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protection against double jeopardy, 13 and the prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment, 14 among others. Procedurally, immigration law is a civil
proceeding subject only to the protections of the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause.'5
Proportionality is key to unraveling this thorny problem. The need for
reform of the immigration remedial scheme has reached a critical point because
of this importation of criminal law norms. While criminal law is animated by
the idea that the punishment must be proportionate to the crime,'
6
proportionality is scarce in immigration law. 17  Criminal law embodies
proportionality in punishment schemes that impose milder sanctions such as
(concluding that because a deportation proceeding is not criminal, an alien is compelled to
answer questions regarding his status); Smith v. INS, 585 F.2d 600, 602 (3d Cir. 1978) (holding
that because a deportation proceeding is civil in nature, an alien can be required to answer
questions about his status as long as the answers would not subject him to criminal liability); cf
Chavez-Raya v. INS, 519 F.2d 397, 401 (7th Cir. 1975) (permitting an alien to invoke privilege
against self-incrimination in deportation proceeding because of possibility of criminal
prosecution for violation of immigration laws); Legomsky, supra note 5, at 515 n.225
(describing how Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination may be invoked in any
proceeding, criminal or civil, if the person asserting the privilege can show that his testimony
would expose him to criminal culpability).
13. U.S. CoNST. amend. V; see De La Teja v. United States, 321 F.3d 1357,1364(11th
Cir. 2003) (noting that the Double Jeopardy Clause only applies to criminal proceedings, and
that deportation is not a criminal proceeding); Urbina-Mauricio v. INS, 989 F.2d 1085, 1089 n.
7 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting an alien's double jeopardy claim because deportation is a "civil
action, not a criminal punishment").
14. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see Ting, 149 U.S. at 730 (concluding that because
deportation is not punishment for a crime, the constitutional prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment does not apply in a deportation proceeding); Elias v. Gonzales, 431 F.3d
268, 276 (6th Cir. 2005) ("[Petitioner's] claim that his deportation constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment lacks merit; the Eighth Amendment is inapplicable to deportation proceedings
because, as the Supreme Court has held, deportation does not constitute punishment."); Briseno
v. INS, 192 F.3d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir. 1999) (concluding that an alien's Eighth Amendment
rights were not violated in a deportation proceeding because deportation is not a criminal
punishment); Oliver v. INS, 517 F.2d 426, 428 (2d Cir. 1975) (rejecting alien's claim that
deportation is cruel and unusual punishment because, despite its severe consequences,
deportation is a civil procedure, not a criminal procedure).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1903)
(asserting that aliens cannot be deported without due process of law); Stumpf, supra note 5, at
392 ("[O]nly the Due Process Clause protects noncitizens in deportation proceedings.").
16. See generally Michael Davis, How to Make the Punishment Fit the Crime, 93 EThics
726 (1983) (advocating a method for incorporating proportionality into retributive punishment
schemes); Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment: From "Why
Punish?"to "How Much?", 25 ISR. L. REv. 549 (1991) (examining the theory of proportionality
as it applies to criminal punishment).
17. See Kanstroom, supra note 7, at 1891 (noting the "automatic and often
disproportionate nature of the deportation sanction"); Legomsky, supra note 5, at 473 ("[The
present state of affairs virtually invites policymakers to abandon any sense of proportion.").
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short or suspended sentences for lesser crimes, and harsher sanctions for graver
crimes. In contrast, the statutory sanction for every immigration violation is
removal from the country. 19 While other sanctions may also result from a
violation of immigration law,20 removal is almost invariably at stake.
Immigration law is, perhaps, the only area of law that eschews
proportionality. Neither the gravity of the violation of immigration law nor the
harm that results bears any relationship to whether deportation is imposed as a
consequence. 2' In criminal law, the rule that a punishment must fit the crime is
articulated in the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment.22 The federal sentencing scheme metes out punishment meant to
be proportionate to the gravity of the defendant's conduct and the harm to the
victim or to society.23 In contract law, damages are graduated based on the
harm to the party who suffered from the breach.24 In tort law, relief is
proportionate to the amount of harm that the plaintiff experienced, keyed to the
amount required to make the plaintiff whole.25 Comparative negligence
schemes allocate damages based on the amount of fault for which the tortfeasor
18. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A(2008) [hereinafter USSG] (setting
out graduated sentences depending on the nature of the offense and differing sets of facts); N.Y.
PENAL LAW §§ 55-85.15 (McKinney 2007) (setting out categories of offenses, gradations of
punishment, and categories of punishment such as incarceration, probation, conditional
discharge, fines, and restitution); OR. REV. STAT. § 137 (2005) (same); Stumpf, supra note 1, at
264-65 (noting that "sanctions for criminal convictions arrange themselves along a spectrum of
severity").
19. Stumpf, supra note 1, at 264.
20. See id. at 265 (noting that immigration law occasionally imposes sanctions other than
deportation, including fines, incarceration, and restrictions on reentry after removal).
21. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (describing the lack of proportionality in
immigration law); see also Maureen Sweeney, Fact or Fiction: The Legal Construction of
Deportation for Crimes (Mar. 16, 2009) (Univ. of Md. Legal Research Paper No. 2009-18),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1361670 (arguing that "for
reasons... of proportionality and equity among similar offenders, automatic deportation does
not appear to be an appropriate or fitting sanction" because it is applied "without reference to
the true severity of the crime or the myriad factors which sentencing courts consider in tailoring
punishment to a crime").
22. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003) (stating
that grossly disproportionate criminal sentences violate the Eighth Amendment).
23. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (describing proportionality in the federal
and state sentencing schemes).
24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (1981) (setting the measure of
damages for breach of contract as the lost value of the other party's performance, plus incidental
or consequential losses caused by the breach, minus costs avoided by not having to perform).
25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 901 (1979) (establishing the general principle




is responsible.26 The law governing punitive damages reins in the passions of
juries by requiring that the amount of the sanction be proportionate to the
violation and its effect on the victim.
27
This Article proposes to realign immigration law with other areas of law
by introducing proportionality norms. Particularly in light of the
criminalization of immigration law, the need is compelling for immigration law
to have a system of graduated sanctions like that in criminal law. Minor
violations, especially when committed by those with significant value and
strong ties to this country, would result in lesser penalties. More serious
violations, especially when committed by those with few ties and who
contribute less to this country, would result in harsher penalties and potentially
removal from the United States.
Part II describes the ubiquity of deportation as an immigration sanction.
Part III traces the history of immigration law sanctions and explains that
deportation was traditionally only one of a variety of immigration remedies.
Part Ill also describes the rise of modem deportation and its central role in the
interplay between immigration law and criminal law, or crimmigration law.
Part IV offers the proposal that immigration law incorporate a graduated system
of sanctions for immigration violations. Part V concludes by offering thoughts
on questions left unanswered.
I. Deportation as the Central Immigration Sanction
Deportation 28 resists categorization as a legal construct. From one
perspective, deportation serves the function of remedying an unlawful situation
by removing from the United States an individual who is not entitled to remain.
For this reason, deportation is not, as a formal matter, criminal punishment.29
There is no real dispute, however, that deportation operates as a sanction, acting
26. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 26 (2000)
(providing that liability for damages can be apportioned among individuals based on percentage
of responsibility in causing the harm).
27. See State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 426 (2003)
("[C]ourts must ensure that the measure of punishment is both reasonable and proportionate to
the amount of harm to the plaintiff and to the general damages recovered.").
28. This Article uses "deportation" to mean any involuntary removal ofa noncitizen from
the country. Thus, the term deportation encompasses the removal of noncitizens with legal
status in the United States as well as those present without government authorization.
29. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594-95 (1952) (explaining that
"deportation, while it may be burdensome and severe for the alien, is not a punishment"
(quoting Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924))).
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as a penalty for an immigration violation. 30 Given that role, it is critical to
evaluate whether the sanction of deportation is meted out in a way that is
consistent with the sanctions schemes of other related areas of law, especially
criminal law.
A. Deportation as an On-Off Switch
The distinction is stark between the principles of criminal penology and
the current immigration sanctions scheme. Criminal punishment reflects the
principle of proportionality, such that less serious crimes result in milder
punishment and vice versa.31  Although commitment to the constitutional
mandate of proportionality in criminal punishment has been shaken in recent
years, 32 the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
33 and state sentencing schemes 34
tend to follow this rule.
30. See Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy, 374 U.S. 469, 479 (1963) (stating that
"deportation is a drastic sanction, one which can destroy lives and disrupt families"); Helvering
v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 n.2 (1938) (noting that the deportation of aliens is a typical
example of the class of remedial sanctions that are free of a punitive criminal element and
involve the revocation of a privilege); Restrepo v. McElroy, 369 F.3d 627, 635 n.16 (2d Cir.
2004) (cautioning that "deportation, like some other kinds of civil sanctions, combines an
unmistakable punitive aspect with non-punitive aspects"); San Pedro v. United States, 79 F.3d
1065, 1074 (11 th Cir. 1996) (explaining that "deportation involves the imposition of a specific
sanction-expulsion from the country").
31. See generally von Hirsch, supra note 16 (examining penal theories to explain how and
why punishments should be proportionate to the gravity of offense); Stumpf, supra note 1
(describing the way in which criminal law calibrates punishments based on the seriousness of
the crime).
32. See, e.g., Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77 (2003) (concluding that a sentence of
two consecutive terms of twenty-five years to life for two felony counts of petty theft under
California's three-strikes law was not disproportionate punishment); Ewing v. California, 538
U.S. 11, 29-30 (2003) (upholding California's "three strikes" law against challenge based on
the Eighth Amendment's proportionality requirement, reasoning that the State had a "legitimate
penological goal" of punishing those who commit repeated criminal acts rather than punishing
the specific offense or conviction).
33. See USSG § 1A1 (2008) (establishing a policy that sentences should be proportional
to the severity of the criminal conduct).
34. See OREGON SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 213.002.0001 (2005) (declaring that the
punishment for a felony conviction should be relative to the seriousness of the crime and the
offender's criminal history); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05 (McKinney 2007) (describing
proportionate penalties based on seriousness of the offense as the purpose of penal laws). But
see CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(A) (West 2007) (subjecting an offender with two prior felony
convictions who is convicted of a third felony to three times the term of imprisonment provided
as punishment for each felony conviction or twenty-five years imprisonment, whichever is
greater, regardless of the seriousness of the crime).
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In contrast, the Immigration and Nationality Act 35 (INA) employs
removal as an on-off switch, rather than reflecting a graduated sanctions
scheme. The INA almost invariably prescribes deportation as the sanction
for an immigration violation.36 Regardless of whether the violation of
immigration law is grave or slight, removal from the country is the statutory
consequence. A college student with a student visa who works an hour
over the maximum mandated by law is removable from the United States
for violating the terms of her visa to the same extent that a serial killer on a
tourist visa is removable as an "aggravated felon. '37 As a practical matter,
the enforcement priorities of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement
agency place the felon in greater danger of deportation than the over-
employed student. 38 Nevertheless, under the INA, the formal consequence
for violating immigration law paints both with the same brush.
Other consequences for immigration violations are occasionally
imposed, but they are in addition to deportation, not instead of it.39 Besides
deportation, an immigration violation may result in incarceration, 40 fines, 4'
35. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2006).
36. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (explaining that immigration law employs
deportation as the central sanction).
37. See INA § 237(a)(l)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i) (subjecting anonimmigrant
visa holder who violates the terms of the visa to deportation); INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (providing for deportation of an alien who is convicted of an aggravated
felony).
38. See U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Fact Sheet, ICE Immigration
Enforcement Initiatives (June 23, 2006), http://web.archive.org/web/20060925233544/http://
www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/immigration_enforcementinitiatives.htm (last visited Sept. 30,
2009) (explaining that ICE has made it a top priority to enforce immigration violations which
threaten national security or public safety) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
39. See Stumpf, supra note 1, at 265 ("[I]mmigration law provides a baseline sanction-
removal-and then stacks additional sanctions on top of that, depending on the nature of the
violation.").
40. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f)(1) (2006) (providing that a criminal penalty of up to six
months imprisonment and a fine of up to $3,000 may be imposed for unlawfully employing
noncitizens); § 1324c(e)(1) (providing that imprisonment for up to five years is the sanction for
failing to disclose a role as a document preparer for a falsely made application for immigration
benefits); § 1325(a) (providing that improperly entering the United States may result in a
criminal fine or imprisonment for up to six months, or both, for the first offense); § 1325(c)
(providing that knowingly marrying to evade immigration laws results in imprisonment for up to
five years (plus a possible $250,000 fine)).
41. See § 1324c (imposing civil penalties for fraudulent immigration documents);
§ 1325(b) (imposing a civil penalty upon a noncitizen apprehended while entering the United
States at a time or place other than as designated by immigration officers); § 1325(c) (imposing
a $250,000 fine for entering into a sham marriage to evade immigration laws).
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or bars to re-entering the United States.42 Criminal conduct that also
constitutes an immigration violation can result in truncated review of the
individual's claim to valid immigration status, and thus a swifter path to
removal.43  Yet these consequences accompany deportation. Unlike
criminal sentencing schemes that erect ladders of progressively harsher
sanctions, the immigration sanctions scheme relies heavily on deportation
as the default sanction, imposing other sanctions as additional burdens.
44
Deportation is the statutory consequence for entering the country
without inspection by U.S. agents at the point of entry45 or for violating
the terms of a visa by working without authorization or beyond
authorized limits. 46 The INA also subjects noncitizens to deportation for
committing a "crime of moral turpitude, 47  or an "aggravated
42. See INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 11 82(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) (applying a three-year bar
to reentry to a noncitizen who has accrued more than 180 days but less than one year of
unlawful presence and who voluntarily departed prior to the commencement of removal
proceedings); INA § 212(a)(6)(G), 8 U.S.C. § 1 182(a)(6)(G) (applying a five-year bar to reentry
to a noncitizen who violates the terms of a student visa); INA § 212(a)(9), 8 U.S.C. § 1 182(a)(9)
(creating five-year and ten-year bars for unlawful presence and reentry after a previous removal
or departure under a removal order).
43. A noncitizen who has committed an aggravated felony is subject to removal without
further review. 8 U.S.C. § 1228. Expedited removal, which eliminates intervention by an
immigration judge, is used when an immigration officer determines that an arriving noncitizen is
inadmissible because of fraud or misrepresentation, among other reasons. § 1225(b). Expedited
review is not limited to noncitizens who have committed crimes. See § 1225(b) (permitting
expedited review for noncitizens who attempt to enter without a passport or visa).
44. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (explaining that other remedies are
available, but they are imposed in addition to deportation and not as altematives to deportation).
For example, a noncitizen who knowingly uses false documents for the purpose of obtaining an
immigration benefit is both deportable and subject to fines. See [NA § 237(a)(3)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(3)(C)(i) (stating that "an alien who is the subject of a final order for violation of
section 274C is deportable"); INA § 274C(d)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(d)(3) (describing fines for
violations).
45. See INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (declaring inadmissible aliens
who enter the United States without being properly admitted); INA § 237(a)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(1)(A) (subjecting inadmissible aliens who entered the United States to deportation).
46. See INA § 237(a)(1)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i) (2006) (subjecting
nonimmigrant visa holders who violate the terms of their visa to deportation).
47. INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). A "crime of moral turpitude"
remains undefined by the INA. Courts examine the "inherent nature of the offense" to
determine whether it falls within the category. See Demleitner, supra note 7, at 1064 ("While
the term has never been defined authoritatively, courts have looked at the 'inherent nature' of
offenses to categorize them."); Brian C. Harms, Redefining "Crimes of Moral Turpitude": A
Proposal to Congress, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 259, 264-69 (2001) (noting that neither Congress
nor the courts have clearly defined "crimes of moral turpitude" and describing different
approaches to classifying such crimes); see also Nate Carter, Shocking the Conscience of
Mankind: Using International Law to Define "Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude" in
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felony,"48 which includes major criminal offenses like murder, drug
trafficking, and firearms trafficking, 49 and an array of minor crimes that
includes misdemeanors. ° Under these provisions, legal permanent residents
regularly face deportation for minor crimes such as turnstile jumping,51 minor
shoplifting, 52 and passing a bad check.
5 3
B. Relieffrom Deportation and Discretion
In theory, a substantial set of exceptions and alternatives to deportation
could form the basis for a proportionate sanctions scheme. In fact, two unique
characteristics of the U.S. immigration system create an appearance of
proportionality. First, the statutory scheme provides for "relief' from
deportation in certain circumstances.5 4 Second, the immigration agency
exercises discretion in setting enforcement priorities and has limited discretion
to decide whether or when a noncitizen must leave the country.5 In this
subpart, I will describe how relief from removal and the existence of agency
discretion create discrete islands of proportionality. Neither, however, results
Immigration Law, 10 LEWIS & CLARKL. REv. 955, 955-58 (2006) (noting the lack ofobjective
criteria for determining whether a crime involves moral turpitude and proposing that courts look
to international law to determine the legal meaning of the term).
48. See INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (providing for deportation
of an alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony).
49. INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43); The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (Drug
Kingpin Act), Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7342, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469.
50. See, e.g., United States v. Elizalde-Altamirano, 226 Fed. App'x 846, 848-49 (10th
Cir. 2007) (declaring joyriding to be an aggravated felony); Miller, supra note 6, at 633-34
(observing that recent legislation has expanded the scope of "aggravated felonies" to include
relatively minor offenses such as gambling, document fraud, obstruction ofjustice, and perjury);
ELIZABETH J. HARPER & ROLAND F. CHASE, IMMIGRATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 383 (3d
ed. 1975) (reporting that offenses such as pandering, receiving stolen goods, and consensual
sodomy have been held to involve moral turpitude).
51. See Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and
the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1936, 1941 (2000) (explaining that
turnstile jumping could constitute a crime of moral turpitude in New York and thus trigger
deportation).
52. See id. at 1939 (noting that a conviction for shoplifting with a one-year suspended
sentence can be deemed an aggravated felony and thus trigger deportation).
53. See Susan L. Pilcher, Justice Without a Blindfold: Criminal Proceedings and the
Alien Defendant, 50 ARK. L. REv. 269,312-13 (1997) (relating that under Georgia law, passing
bad checks involves moral turpitude and thus constitutes a deportable offense).
54. See infra Part II.B.1 (describing the process through which relief from deportation
may be granted).
55. See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing the role of discretion in the deportation context).
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in a remedial framework that calibrates the gravity of the immigration violation
with the sanction.
1. Relieffrom Removal and the Binary Nature of the Deportation
Determination
Relief encompasses a collection of statutory and administrative avenues
for a noncitizen to avoid removal from the country even if she has violated an
immigration law.56 Removal proceedings typically pose two questions. First,
the immigration judge determines whether the noncitizen has violated a
provision of the INA that imposes removal from the United States as a
consequence. 57 If so, the immigration judge usually finds the noncitizen
deportable.5 8 The burden then shifts to the noncitizen to show she is eligible
for relief from deportation.59
On the surface, relief from removal imbues the sanctions scheme with
some level of proportionality. The availability of relief means that some
violations of immigration law do not result in deportation. The distinctions
between the different forms of relief create variation in the likelihood of
deportation.6° Some of the criteria for these forms of relief consider the nature
of the violation,6' furthering the appearance that consequences are
proportionate to the gravity of the violation. However, as I will discuss, the
availability of relief falls short of instituting proportionality in immigration
enforcement.
56. See T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS &
POLICY 775 (6th ed. 2008) (discussing generally the various forms for relief from removal).
57. See DAVID WEISBRODT, IMMIGRATION LAW & PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL 118 (2d ed.
1989) (describing deportation as a system "designed primarily to rid the United States of
statutorily defined undesirables").
58. See, e.g., In re Vu Thang Phan, No. A076-752-061, 2009 WL 773168 (BIA 2009)
("Because we conclude that the respondent has an aggravated felony conviction that renders him
removable .... he must be removed unless he demonstrates that he qualifies for and merits
some form of relief from removal."); see also Alvarez-Garcia v. INS, 234 F. Supp. 2d 283,286-
87 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (employing a two-step process in removal proceedings: first determining
that the defendant is removable and then determining eligibility for relief from removal).
59. INA § 240(c)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (2006) (stating that the government
has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that alien is deportable); INA
§ 240(c)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A) (stating that alien has burden of proof to establish
that she is eligible for relief and, if relief is discretionary, that she merits such relief).
60. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 56, at 776-82 (discussing generally the various
forms of relief from removal and the implications for an alien's status).
61. See In re C-V-T, 22 1. & N. Dec. 7, 11-13 (1998) (listing as a criteria for cancellation
of removal the underlying circumstances of the ground of deportability).
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Relief falls roughly into three categories. In the first are forms of
permanent relief that excuse the underlying ground for removal and also create
or sustain lawful status for the noncitizen in the United States.62 The second
category includes waivers of deportability that wipe away the deportability
ground but do not establish lawful status.63 The third is a catch-all category of
forms of relief that do not endow permanent lawful status, but instead permit
the noncitizen to remain in the country indefinitely or for a limited period of
time.64
The first category of relief includes cancellation of removal, asylum, and
restriction on removal (formerly known as "withholding of removal").
65
Cancellation of removal is the most generous form of relief in that it admits or
restores the noncitizen to the status of a legal permanent resident and purges the
underlying deportation ground.66 Asylum and refugee status67 and restriction
on removal68 provide those threatened with persecution in their home country a
temporary lawful status with a pathway to permanent residence.69
62. See infra notes 65-71 and accompanying text (discussing the various forms of
permanent relief available for permanent resident status); see also ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note
56, at 785-819 (same).
63. See infra notes 72-77 and accompanying text (discussing forms of relief in which
deportation is waived without a grant of lawful status).
64. See infra notes 78-85 and accompanying text (providing alternatives to formal
removal and avenues for staying or delaying deportation).
65. Two other permanent forms of relief exist but their current impact is so small as tobe
unworthy of extended discussion. See INA § 249, 8 U.S.C. § 1259 (2006) (describing the
process of "registry," which creates a lawful admission for noncitizens who arrived in the United
States before 1972, are of good moral character, and are not inadmissible based on various
enumerated grounds, including ties to terrorism or conviction of a crime of moral turpitude).
Recently, only about 200 noncitizens annually have been granted this form of relief. See
ALEINiKOFF ET AL., supra note 56, at 817-18 (citing statistics regarding number of aliens granted
registry). The other form of relief is the passage of a private bill in Congress granting relief
from deportation. Id. at 818-19. Few such bills gain enough support in the House and Senate
to become law. Id. at 819.
66. See INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (restoring or maintaining lawful permanent
resident status or conferring lawful permanent resident status on nonimmigrants and those
without lawful immigration status).
67. See INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (outlining qualifications for asylum and establishing
the time limits for filing an application).
68. See INA§ 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(b)(3) (establishing restrictions on the removal
of aliens to foreign countries where the "alien's life or freedom would be threatened in that
country because of the alien's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion").
69. See INA § 204, 8 U.S.C. § 1159 (providing the means for aliens deemed refugees to
seek permanent resident alien status).
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These permanent forms of relief do not establish a graduated system of
sanctions for immigration violations. Cancellation of removal arises after the
determination that a removal ground applies, as its name suggests.70 At most,
cancellation is like a pardon, extracting the individual from imposition of
deportation. Similarly, asylum and restriction on removal permit a noncitizen
to avoid deportation by endowing a lawful status, and in the case of asylum,
with an avenue to permanent residence.7' Forms of relief such as these that
confer lawful status do not instill proportionality in the immigration remedial
scheme because they are, at bottom, merely part of the deportation
determination. They are purely engaged with the question whether to impose
the sanction of deportation, playing no part in the fundamental question of
whether an alternative sanction or range of sanctions is available.
The second category of relief-waiver--does not create lawful status. A
waiver of a removal ground means that the removal ground does not apply.7 2 A
waiver is usually a step along the way to another form of relief.73 For example,
Section 212(h) of the INA waives certain criminal grounds for removal for
lawful permanent residents, individuals seeking adjustment of status to
permanent residency, and victims of domestic violence seeking to remain in the
United States.74 If the waiver applies, the noncitizen may retain her current
lawful status or apply for such status if she has none.75
The Section 212(h) waiver does not inject proportionality into the
immigration sanctions scheme because, at bottom, the decision about whether
the noncitizen will receive the waiver is part and parcel of the determination
whether to deport her. The question of whether a waiver applies is akin to the
question of liability in civil proceedings or guilt in a criminal trial: It
76determines whether the ground for deportation applies at all. The waiver
70. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 56, at 790-812 (discussing cancellation of
removal).
71. INA §§ 208-209, 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158-1159, 1231(b)(3) (2006).
72. See infra notes 94-112 and accompanying text (describing various waivers).
73. See infra notes 94-112 and accompanying text (describing waiver criteria).
74. See INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (stating that the Attorney General may, in his
discretion, waive certain crimes of moral turpitude). Section 212(h) waives grounds of removal
based on crimes involving moral turpitude, 8 U.S.C. § I 182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), a single offense of
simple possession of thirty grams or less of marijuana, § 11 82(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), multiple criminal
convictions where the aggregate sentence was five years or more, § 11 82(a)(2)(B), prostitution
and commercial vice activities, § 1182(a)(2)(D), and serious criminal offenses involving a grant
of immunity, § 11 82(a)(2)(E). It does not waive removal grounds based on murder, torture, or
drug crimes. Id.
75. INA § 212(h)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1 182(h)(1).
76. For a helpful review of waivers and this relationship to deportation, see ALENKOFF E
AL., supra note 56, at 812-15.
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determination is a decision about whether to remove the noncitizen from the
country." There is no room in the statutory requisites for any alternative
consequence.
The third category of relief includes alternatives to formal removal from
the country and avenues for delaying deportation. Like the other two, this
category of relief mainly creates variations on the likelihood of deportation.
The category includes deferred enforced departure,78 Temporary Protected
Status (TPS),79 voluntary departure,80 parole,8 1 and stays of removal. 82 Only
one results in lawful status and that status is ephemeral: TPS, which provides
temporary refuge for nationals of certain countries in turmoil. 83 The other
forms of temporary relief also delay deportation, but without conferring even a
temporary lawful status.84 Voluntary departure is merely a gentler form of
77. Id.
78. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6 (2007) (permitting the Department ofHomeland Security (DHS) to
seek delay of deportation for noncitizens who would otherwise be placed in danger if deported
to countries undergoing political instability or for other reasons).
79. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 302, 104 Stat. 4978,5030; 8 U.S.C.
§ 1254a (2006).
80. INA § 240B(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(1).
81. INA § 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).
82. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6.
83. See INA § 244(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c) (granting TPS to nationals of the designated
country upon proof that the national was in the United States on or before the date the DHS
Secretary made the TPS designation). Moreover, the availability of TPS is limited, requiring
continuous physical presence in the United States since the TPS designation, continuous
residence in the United States since a date designated by the Attorney General, and compliance
with the generally applicable admissibility requirements. Id.
84. Deferred enforced departure, a humanitarian designation for individuals who would be
placed in danger if deported to countries where there is political or other instability, merely
postpones deportation but does not establish a formal legal status or work authorization. See 8
C.F.R. § 1003.6 (2007) (describing the discretionary stay of removal designated by the
President; it is requested by DHS and approved by the immigration judge). The President has
made only five deferred enforced departure designations since its inception in 1990. National
Immigration Forum, Refugees and Asylum: Deferred Enforced Departure (2007), http://
www.immigrationfor um.org/research/display/deferred-enforced-departure (last visited Sept. 29,
2009) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The designation is usually granted
for twelve or eighteen months. Id. "Parole" is similarly a means of delaying removal, imbuing
the government with discretionary power to permit temporary entrance into the United States for
humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit or pending further investigation. See INA
§ 212(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d) (authorizing the Attorney General to give special consideration
when it is in the national interest). Similar to parole, "deferred action status" is usually granted
when there are compelling humanitarian reasons. Memorandum from Doris Meissner,
Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, to Regional Directors, District
Directors, Chief Patrol Agents, and Regional and District Counsel 7-8 (Nov. 17, 2000),
available at http://www.shusterman.com/pdflMeissner-pros disc_1 1-17-00.pdf. More limited
is a stay of removal, preventing the DHS from executing a removal or exclusion order while the
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deportation. Noncitizens granted voluntary departure have won the right to
depart at their own expense in order to avoid a formal removal order.8 5
The variety of these forms of relief, along with those in the first category
that establish permanent residency, at first appear to support the idea that relief
constitutes a graduated system of sanctions. Like the others, however, these
forms of relief merely contribute to the decision of whether, when, or how a
noncitizen is required to leave the country.86 They are variations on the
underlying decision about whether deportation will occur, rather than operating
as lesser or greater sanctions.
At bottom, relief emphasizes the binary nature of the deportation question
by either permitting the noncitizen to avoid deportation altogether or delaying
it. The variation in the results of immigration hearings does not create true
proportionality because there is no other sanction at issue.
2. Limited Availability of Relief
Moreover, the limited availability of relief renders it still less effective in
establishing a system of proportionate sanctions for immigration law.8 7 Relief
is now so circumscribed that it currently plays a role only at the margins in
limiting the application of deportation as the primary immigration sanction.
The broadest form of cancellation of removal applies only to lawful permanent
residents with long tenures in the United States, and disqualifies those
noncitizen's immigration case is pending final disposition, including during direct appeal to the
Board of Immigration Appeals. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6; IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL 8.2
(2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/vll/OCIJPracManual/Chap%208.pdf.
85. INA § 240B(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(1) (2006); see ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note
56, at 820-26 (discussing the relief of voluntary departure). In other words, it is a way for the
noncitizen to avoid the entry of a removal order while saving the government the cost of a full
proceeding. Id.
86. See ALEINIKOFF ETAL., supra note 56, at 820-26 (discussing voluntary departure and
removal generally and noting that voluntary departure has changed "from an individual benefit
to a docket management tool").
87. See Miller, supra note 6, at 632 (noting that relief for an alien with a criminal
conviction is limited and deportations of criminal aliens continue to rise steeply); Peter H.
Schuck & John Williams, Removing Criminal Aliens: The Pif/alls and Promises ofFederalism,
22 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 367, 393-94 (1999) (explaining that most criminal aliens have
been ineligible for relief since the 1990s); Daniel Kanstroom, Post-Deportation Human Rights
Law: Aspiration, Oxymoron, or Necessity?, 3 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 195, 196 (2007) (noting that
the total number of cases processed by immigration courts and the percentage of those
proceedings which result in removal increased from 2001 to 2005, with 282,396 proceedings in
2001 and 368,848 in 2005, and a removal rate of 78% in 2001 and 84% in 2005); see also INS
v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 297 & n.7 (2001) (noting that recent legislation had "reduced the size
of the class of aliens eligible for... discretionary relief').
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convicted of a plethora of crimes ranging from serious felonies to minor
misdemeanors.88 Noncitizens seeking both cancellation of removal and
permanent resident status must meet stringent requirements, including ten years
of continuous physical presence and proof that removal would result in
"exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to a U.S. citizen or lawful
permanent resident-not to the noncitizen who is the subject of the removal
proceeding.89 Other factors disqualify a noncitizen from relief.90 Cancellation
also requires convincing the immigration court to exercise its discretion by
establishing that the positive equities of permitting the noncitizen to remain
outweigh the negatives. 9'
The criteria for asylum and restriction on removal are similarly stringent.
Noncitizens must establish actual or threatened persecution in their home
country and a nexus between that persecution and their membership in one of
five protected groups.92 Noncitizens who meet those criteria may nevertheless
be ineligible for asylum or restriction on removal if an immigration judge
concludes they could have found refuge in another part of their home country
or a third country, among other reasons.93
88. See INA § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2006) (setting out criteria for cancellation
of removal and excluding individuals convicted of aggravated felonies, as defined in
§ 1101(43), and offenses listed in §§ 1182(a)(2) and 1227(a)(2)).
89. See INA § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (explaining the criteria needed for
cancellation of removal and adjustment of status for a nonpermanent resident); see also In re
Gonzalez Recinas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 467, 468-73 (2002) (elucidating criteria for finding of
"exceptional and extremely unusual hardship").
90. For example, it must be found that the noncitizen has not committed a crime of moral
turpitude, an aggravated felony, or a drug offense, INA § 240A(b)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b)(1)(C) (2006), and that she has maintained "good moral character," INA
§ 240A(b)(l)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(B).
91. See INA § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (explaining the criteria needed for
cancellation of removal and adjustment of status for a nonpermanent resident); In re C-V-T, 22
I. & N. Dec. 7, 11-13 (1998) (establishing that agency discretion is a requirement for
cancellation of removal and listing the positive and negative equities that the agency must
consider).
92. See NA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (setting out asylum procedures); INA § 101(a)(42),8
U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42) (setting out definition of "refugee"); INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3) (defining "restriction on removal"). Asylum and restriction on removal are
available for those persecuted on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or
membership in a particular social group. See § 1158(b)(1)(A) (providing for asylum);
§ 1231 (b)(3) (providing for restriction on removal).
93. See INA § 208(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 11 58(a)(2) (listing procedural limitations on asylum
claims including a one-year filing deadline); INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42) (making
ineligible for asylum individuals who were involved in persecution); INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231 (b)(3)(B) (listing exceptions to restrictions on removal).
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Waivers are also extremely cabined. They are either general, applying to a
broad category of noncitizens and to more than one ground for deportation, 94 or
specific, applying to one or few grounds for deportation or to a single class of
noncitizens.95 The most generous waiver, Section 212(h) of the INA, 96 is too
constrained to contribute to a proportionate system of sanctions. The waiver's
two avenues for relief illustrate its limited nature.97 The first waives removal
grounds based on prostitution or crimes that occurred more than fifteen years
before the noncitizen's application for the immigration benefit.98 The
noncitizen must also show that she has been "rehabilitated" and that her
admission would not be "contrary to the national welfare, safety, or security of
the United States."99 The second avenue requires a showing that removing the
noncitizen would result in "extreme hardship" to a close relative who is a U.S.
citizen or permanent resident, 00 as well as a favorable exercise of discretion
from the Attorney General.' 0 '
94. See INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2006) (allowing Attorney General to waive
multiple subsections for an offense of"simple possession" of marijuana and providing several
reasons for which the Attorney General may waive such subsections); ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra
note 56, at 812-14 (discussing waivers in general).
95. See, e.g., Julie E. Dinnerstein, Options for Immigrant Victims of Domestic Violence,
190 PRAc. L. INST. N.Y. 161, 170 (2009) (discussing the special waiver available for women
who have suffered domestic violence).
96. INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).
97. See id. (providing relief for aliens who committed minor criminal offenses more than
fifteen years prior and have been rehabilitated or are closely related to a United States citizen or
permanent resident alien to whom denial of entry would cause hardship and allowing entry
would not threaten the government's interest).
98. Id.
99. INA § 212(h)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(A).
100. INA § 212(h)(l)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(B).
101. See INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (stating that extreme hardship to a spouse,
parent, son, or daughter must be "established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General" to
qualify for waiver). For established permanent residents, the Section 212(h) waiver is further
restricted. It applies only to permanent residents who have resided lawfully and continuously in
the United States for seven years prior to the removal proceeding, and does not apply at all if the
permanent resident has committed an "aggravated felony," a term of art in immigration law that
encompasses a wide variety of crimes including misdemeanors and minor crimes. Id. Equal
Protection challenges to Section 212(h) claiming discrimination based on distinctions between
permanent residents and nonpermanent residents have been largely unsuccessful. See Lara-Ruiz
v. INS, 241 F.3d 934, 947-48 (7th Cir. 2001) (applying rational basis review and holding that
there is a reasonable justification for the distinction between permanent residents and
nonpermanent residents); Jankowski-Burczyk v. INS, 291 F.3d 172, 178 (2d Cir. 2002)
(rejecting Equal Protection challenge and holding that permanent residents and nonpermanent
residents are not similarly situated); cf. Roman v. Ashcroft, 181 F. Supp. 2d 808, 812 (N.D.
Ohio 2002) (upholding Equal Protection challenge), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
340 F.3d 314 (6th Cir. 2003).
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The more specific waivers of removal grounds, applying to discrete
grounds for removal, are similarly too cabined to contribute proportionality.
Most are restricted to close relatives of U.S. citizens or residents and depend
upon an immigration official or judge to exercise favorable discretion.10 2 For
example, obtaining a waiver for using false documents to procure employment
is available only to permanent residents 0 3 and only upon proof that the
102. See INA § 209(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c) (2006) (providing a discretionary waiver of
Section 212(a) inadmissibility grounds in order to assure family unity, except when
inadmissibility is based on any of several grounds enumerated in INA § 212(a)(3)(D)(iv), 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(D)(iv)); INA § 212(a)(3)(D)(iv), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(D)(iv) (waiving
inadmissibility grounds for membership in a totalitarian party for close family members of
United States citizens or legal permanent residents); INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(v), 8 U.S.C.
§ 11 82(a)(9)(B)(v) (waiving inadmissibility grounds for unlawful presence in the United States
for an alien seeking permanent resident status who is the spouse, son, or daughter of a United
States citizen or permanent resident who would suffer extreme hardship if admission is refused);
INA § 212(d)(1 1), 8 U.S.C. § 1 182(d)(1 1) (providing waiver of inadmissibility ground of
smuggling applicable only to permanent residents or those seeking entry as permanent residents,
and only for smuggling of spouse, parent, son, or daughter); INA § 212(d)(12), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(d)(12) (waiving inadmissibility ground for document fraud under § 1324C for aliens
seeking admission or adjustment of status to permanent residency based on an immediate family
petition if the fraud was to assist, aid, or support the alien's spouse or child); INA § 212(e), 8
U.S.C. § 1182(e) (waiving the requirement for an alien admitted on a visitor "J" visa to return to
his or her country of nationality if, inter alia, it would impose exceptional hardship upon a
spouse or child who is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident); INA § 212(g), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(g) (waiving inadmissibility grounds based on communicable diseases and physical or
mental disorders for alien spouses, parents, or unmarried children of United States citizens or
permanent residents); INA § 212(h)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(B) (waiving inadmissibility
grounds based on certain criminal convictions if removal would cause extreme hardship to a
spouse, parent, son, or daughter who is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident); INA
§ 212(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i) (waiving inadmissibility grounds based on misrepresentation in
seeking admission to the United States if removal would cause extreme hardship to a spouse,
parent, son, or daughter who is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident); INA 216a(c)(4), 8
U.S.C. § 11 86a(c)(4) (waiving inadmissibility for aliens granted conditional permanent resident
status based on marriage who failed to meet the requirements to remove the conditional nature
of their status if, inter alia, the marriage was entered in good faith and ended without the alien's
fault or if the alien spouse or child was abused); INA §§ 237(a)(l)(E)(ii)-(iii), 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1227(a)(1)(E)(ii)-(iii) (waiving deportability ground of smuggling available only to
permanent residents (or noncitizens eligible for permanent residency) and only for smuggling of
spouse, parent, son, or daughter); INA § 237(a)(1)(H), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H) (providing
waiver for inadmissibility based on fraud at the time of entering the United States if the alien is
an immediate relative of a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident, is in possession of
an immigrant visa, and is otherwise eligible for lawful permanent residency); INA
§ 237(a)(3)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(C)(ii) (waiving deportability grounds for a § 1324C
document fraud violation if the fraud was for the purpose of aiding the alien's spouse or child).
103. INA § 237(a)(3)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(C)(ii). Other family-based waivers
have similarly restrictive conditions. Noncitizens whose permanent residence status arises from
their marriage to a U.S. citizen are subject to a two-year period of conditional residency. INA
§ 216(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(b)(1). At the end of that period, the noncitizen is removable
unless she files jointly with her spouse a petition to remove the conditional aspect of her
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violation was "solely to aid, assist or support" the noncitizen's spouse or child
and no one else.'
1 4
Outside of the family context, the grounds for waivers of deportation fall
into three major categories: waiver of most inadmissibility grounds for
refugees seeking adjustment of status to permanent residency, 0 5 waivers
available to battered women and children, 106 and waivers of some criminal
deportability grounds in the rare event of a full executive pardon.'0 7 As with
residency and successfully passes an interview with an immigration officer. INA § 216(c)(1), 8
U.S.C. § 11 86a(c)(1). Waiver of that joint filing requirement and interview is discretionary, and
contingent upon showing: (a) that deportation would cause extreme hardship due to factors
arising only within the two-year conditional period; (b) that she entered into the marriage in
good faith but it was either terminated (except by death of her spouse) or her spouse battered her
or her child or subjected her or her child to extreme cruelty; and (c) she was not at fault in
failing to filejointly. INA § 216(c)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4).
104. INA § 237(a)(3)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(C)(ii). As another example, the waiver
of the deportability ground for smuggling another alien applies only to permanent residents (or
noncitizens eligible for permanent residency) and only if the smuggling involved a spouse,
parent, son, or daughter (but not, for example, a sibling or grandparent).
105. See INA § 209(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c) (waiving most Section 212(a) inadmissibility
grounds for refugees when such waiver is for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or
when otherwise in the public interest); see also INA § 212(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(e) (establishing
discretionary waiver of two-year foreign residency requirement for holders of student "J" visas,
INA § 101(a)(15)(J), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(J), if alien would be subject to persecution if
returned to her country of nationality or last residence).
106. See INA § 237(a)(1)(H)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H)(ii) (waiving Section
212(a)(6)(C)(i) inadmissibility grounds based on fraud or misrepresentation at the time of
entering the United States for self-petitioners under the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA)); INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (waiving Sections 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)-(II), (B),
(D), and (E) inadmissibility grounds based on a criminal conviction for VAWA self-petitioners
when the Attorney General agrees to the alien's application); INA § 212(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)
(waiving Section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) inadmissibility grounds based on misrepresentation when
seeking admission for VAWA self-petitioners who demonstrate extreme hardship to the alien or
to the alien's citizen, lawful permanent resident, or qualified alien parent or child); INA
§ 212(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(g) (waiving Section 212(a)(1)(A) inadmissibility grounds based on
medical or mental condition if the alien is a VAWA self-petitioner); NA § 212(a)(9)(C)(iii), 8
U.S.C. § 11 82(a)(9)(C)(iii) (waiving Section 212(a)(9)(C)(i) inadmissibility grounds based on
unlawful presence after previous immigration violations for a VAWA self-petitioner if there is a
connection between the alien's battering or subjection to extreme cruelty and the alien's
removal, departure, reentry, or attempted reentry to the United States); INA § 2 37(a)(7), 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(7) (waiving deportability grounds based on domestic violence ifthe alien was
acting in self-defense, violated a protective order intended to protect the alien, or the domestic
violence-related crime did not result in serious bodily harm and was connected to the alien's
subjection to battery or extreme cruelty).
107. See INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(vi), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(vi) (waiving deportability
grounds based on Sections 237(a)(2)(A)(i) (crime of moral turpitude), (A)(ii) (multiple criminal
convictions), (A)(iii) (aggravated felony conviction), and (A)(iv) (high speed flight) for an alien
who receives a full and unconditional pardon by a state governor or the President). Waiver
based on a pardon is inapplicable to drug trafficking or controlled substance offense
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the family-related waivers, all three of these waiver categories have restrictions
on their availability. Refugees may not obtain a waiver if their admission
would create adverse foreign policy consequences or if they committed certain
crimes or engaged in terrorism or Nazi persecution. 0 8 Some waivers based on
domestic violence exclude victims if the Attorney General does not agree to the
alien's seeking admission or permanent residency, 109 require proof of extreme
hardship to a close family member who is a U.S. citizen or permanent
resident,' 10 or scrutinize the circumstances surrounding the battery or extreme
cruelty.' An executive pardon will waive only deportability (not
inadmissibility) grounds for specific crimes and only if the pardon is full and
unconditional." 12
convictions. See In re Yeun, 12 I. & N. Dec. 325, 327 (1967) (stating that a "pardon [is]
ineffective in the case of any alien who has been convicted of a narcotic violation").
108. See INA § 209, 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c) (2006) (excluding from waiver certain
inadmissibility grounds based on Sections 212(a)(2)(C) (drug trafficking), (3)(A) (entering
solely for illegal activity), (3)(B) (terrorist activity), (3)(C) (adverse foreign policy
consequences), and (3)(E) (participant in Nazi persecution, genocide, torture, or extrajudicial
killing)).
109. See INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (waiving for VAWA self-petitioners Sections
212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), (II), (B), (D), and (E) inadmissibility grounds based on a criminal conviction
when the Attorney General agrees to the alien's application).
110. See INA § 212(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i) (waiving Section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) inadmissibility
grounds based on misrepresentation for VAWA self-petitioners who demonstrate extreme
hardship to the alien or to the alien's United States citizen, lawful permanent resident, or
qualified alien parent or child).
111. See INA § 212(a)(9)(C)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § I1 82(a)(9)(C)(iii) (waiving Section
212(a)(9)(C)(i) inadmissibility grounds based on unlawful presence after previous immigration
violations for a VAWA self-petitioner if there is a connection between the alien's battering or
subjection to extreme cruelty and the alien's removal, departure, reentry, or attempted reentry to
the United States); INA § 237(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(7) (waiving deportability grounds
based on domestic violence if the alien was acting in self-defense, violated a protective order
intended to protect the alien, or the domestic violence-related crime did not result in serious
bodily harm and was connected to the alien's subjection to battery or extreme cruelty).
112. See 1NA § 237(a)(2)(A)(vi), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(vi) (waiving deportability
grounds based on Sections 237(a)(2)(A)(i) (crime of moral turpitude), (A)(ii) (multiple criminal
convictions), (A)(iii) (aggravated felony conviction), and (A)(iv) (high speed flight) for an alien
who receives a full and unconditional pardon by a state governor or the President); In re Jung
Tae Sub, 23 1. & N. Dec. 626, 626 (2003) (stating that a pardon for crimes of child abuse and
domestic violence does not fall within the waiver granted in Section 237(a)(2)(E)(i)); see also
Matthew L. Benson & Marisa N. Palmieri, I Got a Great Plea Agreement for My Client But He
Ended up Being Deported-Immigration Considerations for the Kentucky Criminal
Practitioner, 34 N. Ky. L. REv. 547, 569 (2007) (describing pardon restrictions). The pardon
waiver does not, therefore, cover any of the grounds not listed, such as drug-trafficking or
controlled-substance convictions. See Yeun, 12 I. & N. Dec. at 327 (stating that a "pardon [is]
ineffective in the case of any alien who has been convicted of a narcotic violation").
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In sum, the existence of relief in the INA does not inject proportionality
into the immigration sanctions scheme because relief merely influences the
decision whether the noncitizen will be deported. Relief does not provide
alternative sanctions. Rather, it merely moves the deportation decision up or
down on the spectrum of ease of proof.
3. Discretion
Agency discretion pervades immigration law." 3 Discretion to decline to
pursue the removal of any noncitizen or to grant relief from removal introduces
a level of individualized decisionmaking about the consequences of an
immigration violation. 14 However, as currently structured, it fails to create a
proportionate remedial scheme for immigration law.
Agency discretion comes in several forms. First, like criminal prosecutors,
immigration law enforcement officers have prosecutorial discretion to decline
to initiate removal proceedings" 5 and to decide which immigration law
violations to charge.'1 6  Decisions not to prosecute are usually based on
113. See Daniel Kanstroom, The Better Part of Valor: The Real ID Act, Discretion, and
the "Rule" oflImmigration Law, 51 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REv. 161, 166 (2006-2007) ("Discretion has
been so deeply intertwined with statutory immigration law for more than fifty years that much of
the whole enterprise could fairly be described as a fabric of discretion. This is particularly true
of deportation law."). See generally Daniel Kanstroon, Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut:
Discretion and Deference in U.S. Immigration Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 703, 709 (1997)
(describing U.S. immigration law in practice as a "fabric of discretion and judicial deference");
Gerald L. Neuman, Discretionary Deportation, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 614 (2006)
(describing deportation "as a rule-governed sanction with enforcement discretion").
114. See Neuman, supra note 113, at 621 (explaining that discretion "permits adjudicators
to engage in individualized decision making, considering the full complexity of an applicant's
situation rather than reducing it to a checklist of standard factors").
115. Meissner Issues Prosecutorial Discretion Guidance on Her Last Day as INS
Commissioner, 77 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1661 (2000) [hereinafter Meissner]. The DHS
occasionally curtails its officers' discretion through, for example, "zero-tolerance" policies such
as Operation Streamline. In 2005, DHS initiated the Operation, which constituted a joint effort
with the U.S. Department of Justice to detain and prosecute all unauthorized border-crossers
along a defined stretch of the U.S.-Mexican border. See Press Release, Dep't of Homeland Sec.,
Remarks by Homeland Sec. Sec'y, Michael Chertoff and Attorney Gen. Mukasey at a Briefing
on Immigration Enforcement and Border Sec. Efforts (Feb. 22, 2008), http://www.dhs.gov/
xnews/releases/pr1203722713615.shtm (last visited Sept. 29, 2009) (describing Operation
Streamline) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Anne B. Chandler,
Why Is the Policeman Asking for M Visa? The Future of Federalism and Immigration
Enforcement, 15 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 209, 231 n.84 (2008) (summarizing Chertoff's
argument).
116. See Meissner, supra note 115, at 1161 (stating that "INS officers may decline to
prosecute a legally sufficient immigration case if the Federal immigration enforcement interest
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humanitarian reasons. 117 In its close resemblance to the discretion granted to
criminal prosecutors, prosecutorial discretion granted to immigration officials
has no bearing on the proportionality of the sanction ultimately imposed.
Second, higher-level agency officials have exercised discretion to create
some of the alternate avenues for delaying or staying deportation, including
deferred enforced departure" 18 and deferred action.1 9 These avenues, as I have
explained, provide variations on whether or when deportation will occur, but
they do not contribute to a more proportionate remedial scheme in which
deportation is one of a set of sanctions.
The same is true of the discretion that immigration courts have to confer a
lawful immigration status or grant relief.120 Immigration courts do not have
discretion to override the statutory eligibility requirements for lawful status or
relief from removal or to impose different sanctions or remedies. 12' Discretion
is limited to granting or denying relief once a noncitizen has met the statutory
requirements. 122 The noncitizen must convince the agency that relief is proper,
for example, "for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when
otherwise in the public interest."'123  Thus, the question of whether the
immigration court will exercise discretion limits the availability of relief, rather
than expanding it, because it comes into play only once the statutory
requirements for deportation are met. In the end, the court's discretion remains
confined within the question of whether or not to deport.
that would be served by prosecution is not substantial").
117. Taylor & Wright, supra note 9, at 1173 n.153.
118. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6 (2007); see also supra notes 78, 84 (describing deferred enforced
departure).
119. See supra note 84 (describing deferred action).
120. See Kanstroom, supra note 113, at 172 (discussing discretion in relief
determinations).
121. See Neuman, supra note 113, at 615 (noting that the INA "enumerates grounds of
deportability, and the executive has no authority to deport foreign nationals for other,
unenumerated reasons").
122. See Kanstroom, supra note 113, at 172 (discussing the role of discretion in relief
determinations: The statutory standard for relief"provided a right to a ruling on an applicant's
eligibility," while "'the actual granting of relief was not a matter of right under any
circumstances, but rather is in all cases a matter of grace"' (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S.
289, 308 (2001))).
123. INA § 237(a)(l)(E)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(E)(iii) (2006). At least one waiver of
deportability is nondiscretionary. See INA § 237(a)(1)(E)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(E)(ii)
(providing that an eligible immigrant who was present in the United States prior to May 5,
1988, and has encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided only a spouse, parent, son, or
daughter to enter the United States illegally prior to May 5, 1988, is not deportable under INA
§ 237(a)(1)(E)(i) for smuggling).
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Viewed as elements of the decision of whether to impose deportation,
these forms of discretion are not a form of proportionality. The agency's power
to exercise discretion does not, for example, permit imposition of a fine rather
than removal. An immigration agent's decision whether to prosecute, an
agency head's institution of a policy exempting from or delaying deportation of
categories of noncitizens, and an immigration court's individualized grant or
denial of relief from removal each constitute a determination of whether the
sanction of deportation is proper. They are not choosing from an array of
alternative sanctions.
III. A Brief History of Immigration Sanctions
Evaluating the current system of immigration sanctions requires a look
backward at how immigration violations have been addressed traditionally.
This section traces a brief history of immigration-related sanctions. Although
under current immigration law any violation renders a noncitizen removable, it
was not always that way. 12 4 Deportation in its current form is a relative
newcomer to immigration law. In an earlier era, inmigration consequences had
more in common with the graduated remedial scheme found in criminal law,
contract law, and tort law than with the current system of immigration
sanctions.1
25
A. State-Created Sanctions: Early Approaches
Before the founding of the United States, and for nearly a century
afterward, the states led the way in regulating international and domestic
migration. 126 Because the fledgling United States had a strong interest in
encouraging immigration, there was little incentive to place restrictions on entry
or expend resources on removal of immigrants. 127 Federal governance of
124. See infra Part III.A (summarizing different penalties for violating immigration laws in
American history).
125. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text (describing the doctrines governing
damages).
126. See GERALD L. NEuMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS,
AND FuNDAMENTAL LAW 19 (1996) ("Regulation of transborder movement of persons existed,
primarily at the state level .... ").
127. See E.P. HuTcHINsON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY
(1798-1965) 389 (1981) (discussing incentives for noncitizens to settle in the United States);
Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to
Understanding the Nature of Immigration Removal Proceedings, 43 HARv. C.R-C. L. REv. 289,
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immigration was sparse and deportation rare. 128 In 1798, Congress passed the
Alien and Sedition Laws, authorizing the President to order deportation when
an alien was deemed dangerous to the United States. 29 Failure to depart in a
timely manner could result in three years imprisonment and a bar to
citizenship. 130 Most of these laws, of questionable constitutionality at their
inception, were never enforced.1
31
The Naturalization Act of 1798132 required white aliens to register with a
designated official within forty-eight hours of arrival, or for those already
present in the country, within six months of the law's passage. 33  The
Naturalization Act imposed a fine for failure to register and nominally required
registration as a prerequisite to naturalization, but it had no provision for
removal of the offender. 134 The law was ignominiously repealed in 1802 after
years of noncompliance. 1
35
In contrast, state laws governing migration across state borders employed
three categories of sanctions: removal of the immigrant, punishment of the
immigrant, and punishment of the party responsible for the immigrant's
324 (2008) ("[T]he colonies were primarily interested in encouraging immigration and, as a
result, neither the exclusion nor the expulsion of noncitizens was a significant feature of the
colonies' immigration laws.").
128. See Markowitz, supra note 127, at 324 (stating that "expulsion" was not a
"significant" immigration tool); HuTcHINsoN, supra note 127, at 388 ("[I]t was the states that
took the place of the colonies and inherited the problems and responsibilities related to
immigration.").
129. Naturalization Act of 1798, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566 (repealed 1802); Alien Enemies Act,
ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798); Alien Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798); Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat.
596 (1798); see Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century ofAmerican Immigration Law (1776-
1875), 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1833, 1881 (1993) (describing the "package of legislation known to
history as the Alien and Sedition Acts").
130. Alien Act § 1.
131. Markowitz, supra note 127, at 326 (citing Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in
Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins ofPlenary Power
over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REv. 1, 87-98 (2002)); Gregory Fehlings, Storm on the
Constitution: The First Deportation Law, 10 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 63, 74 (2002). The
exception is the Alien Enemy Act of 1798, Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (current
version at 50 U.S.C. §§ 21-24 (2006)). See Stephen J. Vladeck, Enemy Aliens, Enemy
Property, and Access to the Courts, 11 LEwIs & CLARK L. REv. 963, 967-77 (2007)
(documenting use of the act during wartimes since its enactment).
132. Naturalization Act of 1798, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566 (repealed 1802).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Act of Apr. 14, 1802, ch. 28, § 2,2 Stat. 153,154; see also Neuman, supra note 129,
at 1882 (stating that the Naturalization Act of 1798 was ignored and that it was repealed in
1802).
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entry. 136 State laws restricting passage of migrants across state borders sought
to bar from entry three societal ills: crime, poverty, and disease. 137 They also
imposed barriers based on race and religion. 138 Although these laws tended to
apply to both domestic and international travelers, the effect was that the
fledgling states governed immigration for the first century of this country's
existence.139 The types of sanctions that these early state laws employed to
enforce these restrictions on migration varied, but most states penalized those
responsible for importing the convict into the state.
40
Two major types of immigration violations resulted in sanctions.
Sanctions were a consequence either of violating a state restriction on entry'
4'
or of post-entry conduct by an individual who was not a citizen of that state.1
42
Although state laws often permitted physical removal of undesirable
noncitizens from the territory, many states focused less on the noncitizen than
on the party responsible for the noncitizen's entry into the state. 143 Laws
prohibiting the entry of out-of-state felons imposed sanctions on the felon that
136. See Neuman, supra note 129, at 1883 (detailing these "three principal methods for
dealing with undesired immigration").
137. See NEUMAN, supra note 126, at 20 (describing categories of state immigration laws).
138. See EMBERSON EDWARD PROPER, COLONIAL IMMIGRATION LAWS: A STUDY OF THE
REGULATION OF IMMIGRATION BY THE ENGLISH COLONIES IN AMERICA 17-18 (1900) (explaining
that many of the colonies had laws preventing Catholics from admission); id. at 33, 63
(describing laws passed in colonial Virginia and Connecticut barring Quakers from entering);
Neuman, supra note 129, at 1879 (noting that prior to the Civil War Illinois enacted laws
prohibiting blacks, slave or free, from entering); id. at 1873 (revealing that many Southern states
had laws prohibiting free blacks from entering prior to the Civil War); id. at 1866-67 n.219
(detailing how many Northern states, including Indiana and Ohio, passed laws in the early
1800s to prevent free blacks from entering). Legislation prohibiting the immigration of free
blacks arose in part from fears of revolutionaries from the West Indies and blacks from
abolitionist states. See id. at 1866-67, 1869 (citing a Georgia act that prohibited importing
slaves from the West Indies and required security from free blacks). California's attempts to bar
Chinese immigrants were the precursors to the first federal immigration restrictions. See id. at
1872 (describing the connections between West Coast legislation excluding the Chinese and the
subsequent federal Chinese Exclusion Act, Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Cal. Stat. 58); Kerry
Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration Law, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 641, 671-77 (2005) (discussing several California laws that were passed from the 1850s to
the 1870s to deter the immigration of Chinese persons, including anti-prostitution laws, miners'
tax laws, and Chinese labor laws).
139. NEUMAN, supra note 126, at 19.
140. Neuman, supra note 129, at 1842.
141. See NEUMAN, supra note 126, at 20-34 (describing immigration laws restricting the
entry of criminals, "the poor," and "those exhibiting signs of contagious disease," and noting the
penalties for violating such prohibitions).
142. See id. at 22-23 ("In 1917 the federal government also began deporting aliens from
the United States for committing crimes of moral turpitude after their arrival.").
143. Id. at 21.
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included removal beyond the state border' 44 but often also required the party
responsible for importing the felon to cover the cost of removal.
145
Similarly, state restrictions on entry of impoverished migrants permitted
removal as a sanction but were seldom employed.' 46 State immigration laws
were a primary means by which states sought to exclude the poor. State laws
sought to prevent the settlement of those who might require public assistance
by "removing" them to the place that they "legally" originated or settled.
147
Such aliens were not permitted to settle lawfully.148 As a result, they remained
indefinitely subject to deportation by local officials at public expense. 149
Though widespread, these provisions were seldom enforced. 5 0 Instead,
states invented alternate means of encouraging poor immigrants to leave, such
as orders to depart upon threat of whipping or incarceration.15' More
commonly, they imposed bonds, fines, or criminal liability on the transporter of
the indigent person.152  As one example, New York, which became the
principal port of entry for immigrants arriving by sea, discontinued in 1797 the
144. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 10, 1787, 1787 Ga. Laws 40 (requiring removal ofthe felon and
prohibiting reentry upon pain of death).
145. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 27, 1789, ch. 33., 1789 Pa. Laws 76 (mandating that the party
responsible for bringing the convict into Pennsylvania cover the cost of the convict's removal);
Act of Jan. 28, 1797, ch. 511, § 3, 1797 N.J. Laws 131 (requiring the party who imported the
convict to pay for the convict's removal).
146. See NEUMAN, supra note 126, at 23-31 (describing state "poor laws" authorizing
removal as a penalty but also stating that such penalties were "weakened in practice, if not on
the books").
147. Id. at 23, 198 n.38. A 1794 Massachusetts law provided that an impoverished
individual could be removed "by land or water, to any other State, or to any place beyond the
sea, where he belongs." Act of Feb. 26, 1794, ch. 32, 1794 Mass. Acts 383.
148. See NEUMAN, supra note 126, at 26 (describing Massachusetts's poor laws in which
"unnaturalized immigrants remained permanently subject to deportation under the provisions of
the poor laws").
149. See id. (citing as examples Act ofFeb. 26, 1794, § 13, 1794 Mass. Acts 375, 379, and
MASS. PUB. STAT. ch. 86, § 30 (1886)).
150. See id. at 30 (describing a study that found that "settlement provisions went largely
unenforced" (quoting James W. Ely, "There Are Few Subjects in Political Economy of Greater
Difficulty": The Poor Laws of the Antebellum South, 1985 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 849, 859
(1985))).
151. Id. at 29 (citing R.I. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 35 (1857)).
152. id. at 25 (citing Act of Feb. 26, 1794, ch. 32, § 15, 1794 Mass. Acts 375, 379); id. at
27 (citing N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. 1, ch. 20, tit. 1, 9§ 64 (1829); N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. 1, ch. 20, tit. 1,
§ 64 (1836)); id. at 29 (citing Act of June 1847, 1847 R.I. Pub. Laws 27, R.I. REV. STAT. ch.
51, §§ 5-8 (1857)); id. at 29-30 (citing Act of Mar. 29, 1803, §§ 21, 23, 1801-03 Pa. Laws
507, 525-26).
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removal of European alien paupers in favor of a system of bonds and reporting
by masters of the vessels transporting the newcomers.'53
Sanctions for entry of persons with communicable diseases followed a
similar pattern. Many state laws simply excluded immigrants with either
communicable or noncommunicable diseases.154 Others required removal of
the infected individual or imposed fines or quarantine for violating prohibitions
against contact with an infected community. 155
The only means in these early years to expel a noncitizen after admission
was banishment.156 Banishment for post-entry conduct, also known as "exile"
or "transportation," was reserved for out-of-state citizens and foreign
immigrants.157 It arose as a form of criminal punishment,' 58 and it was a means
of purging the United States of British loyalists.' 59 Unlike the modem form of
deportation, banishment was imposed only after the full panoply of criminal
procedures and protections. 160  Thus, the Framers of the Constitution were
unfamiliar with civil deportation as it exists today.
153. Neuman, supra note 129, at 1854-85 (citing Act of Apr. 3, 1797, ch. 101, § 2, 1797
N.Y. Laws 134, 135).
154. NEUMAN, supra note 126, at 31-32.
155. See CoNN. REv. STAT. tit. 91, § 6 (1821) (specifying a fine for willfully violating
prohibition against communication with an infected town in an adjoining state); Act of Apr. 17,
1795, ch. 327, § 4, 1795 Pa. Acts 735 (providing for fines and quarantine for violating
prohibition against intercourse with infected places in the United States); see also NEUMAN,
supra note 126, at 31-32 (summarizing the use of quarantines in American history).
156. Markowitz, supra note 127, at 325; see Kanstroom, supra note 7, at 1908 (noting that
early state laws, "which often focused on the exclusion of convicted criminals, seem never to
have focused on the deportation of noncitizens for post-entry criminal conduct").
157. See Javier Bleichmar, Deportation as Punishment: A Historical Analysis of the
British Practice of Banishment and Its Impact on Modern Constitutional Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 115, 116-17 (1999) (explaining that at the time of the United States' founding, banishment
was a form of punishment and noting that courts have either misunderstood this history or
ignored it when ruling that deportation is purely a civil remedy). See generally Markowitz,
supra note 127 (arguing that the history of deportation and its roots in banishment as a criminal
punishment compels the application of criminal law protections in proceedings involving
expulsion of lawful permanent residents).
158. See NEUMAN, supra note 126, at 21-22 (stating that transportation to America was a
punishment imposed by European governments on convicts and that the U.S. government also
deported aliens "for committing crimes of moral turpitude after their arrival").
159. See id. at 23 (describing the "first century of American independence" as a period that
"began with the massive banishment of British loyalists"); see also Markowitz, supra note 127,
at 327 (describing New York's removal process in which "officials ... conducted the stranger to
the town from which she had come until they reached a town where the stranger was legally
settled or passed the stranger on across the border of the state").
160. Markowitz, supra note 127, at 325.
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B. Federal Sanctions: From 1870 to the 1920s
The first federal law imposing immigration-related sanctions in the new
age of federal regulation of immigration law began not with deportation, but
with criminal penalties: incarceration, fines, and hard labor. The
Naturalization Act of 187 0 ,161 which extended the privilege of naturalization
"to aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent," made use of
all three of these penalties. 162 The Act threatened fines, incarceration, and hard
labor for knowingly committing perjury relating to naturalization proceedings
or fraudulently obtaining a certificate of citizenship. 1
63
When federal regulation of immigration began in earnest in 1875, it
restricted the entry of noncitizens but did not institute deportation of those who
had been admitted. 164 Responding to allegations of widespread importation of
"Chinese prostitutes and European criminals,"' 165 Congress passed restrictions
on entry based on prostitution and crimes of moral turpitude. 166 Widespread
anti-Chinese sentiment led Congress to pass the Chinese Exclusion Act of
1882167 and other statutes expanding the categories of excludable aliens. 68
As with naturalization, criminal penalties including incarceration, fines,
and hard labor were the first tools Congress chose to enforce its new
immigration laws. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 subjected the master of
any vessel who knowingly transported a Chinese laborer to imprisonment for
161. See Naturalization Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 254, 16 Stat. 254 (establishing penalties
for certain crimes that could be committed during the naturalization process and extending
naturalization laws to "aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent").
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Kanstroom, supra note 7, at 1909.
165. HUTcHiNSON, supra note 127, at 66.
166. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (repealed 1974); see Mae M. Ngai, The
Strange Career of the Illegal Alien: Immigration Restriction and Deportation Policy in the
United States, 1921-1965, 21 LAW & HIST. REv. 69, 73 (2003) ("In 1875 Congress legislated
the first federal restrictions on entry when it banned persons convicted of 'crimes involving
moral turpitude' and prostitutes. . . ."); see also Abrams, supra note 138, at 693-94 (positing
that the Page Act was passed to stop the entry of Chinese women in order to prevent perceived
disruption of accepted conceptions of marriage and family).
167. See Chinese Exclusion Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (suspending the
immigration of Chinese laborers to the United States and exempting those Chinese laborers who
were present in the United States before November 17, 1880).
168. Immigration Act ofAug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214; Act ofFeb. 26, 1885, ch.164,
23 Stat. 332 (repealed 1952); Act of Feb. 23, 1887, ch. 220, 24 Stat. 414; see also Ngai, supra
note 166, at 73 (detailing the expanding class of persons excluded under contemporary
immigration restrictions); HUTCHINSON, supra note 127, at 83 (describing the changing
circumstances in the nation that surrounded the expansion of immigration laws).
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up to one year. 169  A fraudulent immigration certificate could lead to
imprisonment for up to five years, 170 and aiding a Chinese person who was
ineligible to lawfully enter the United States could result in a year's
confinement.' 71 In 1884, aiding a noncitizen's entry in violation of the labor
contract laws invited a $500 fine. 172 The grounds for exclusion expanded
during the 1880s, but without provisions for guarding the border, excludable
noncitizens continued to enter.173 Such noncitizens were typically imprisoned
if discovered. 1
74
When deportation laws finally appeared in the late 1880s, their reach was
very limited in comparison to current law. The first federal deportation laws
confined deportation to conditions existing at or prior to entry into the
country.175 In 1888, Congress mandated that aliens who landed in violation of
contract labor laws176 were to be deported at their own expense or at the
expense of the owner of the importing vessel. 177 It was the first time since the
dubious legislation of 1798178 that Congress had authorized deportation of
aliens already present in the United States. In 1891, Congress provided for
removal within one year of any noncitizen who was inadmissible at the time of
entry. 179 The 1891 Act also authorized deportation of"any alien who becomes
169. Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 § 2, 22 Stat. at 59.
170. Id.
171. Id. § 7.
172. Act of Feb. 26, 1885, ch. 164, § 4, 23 Stat. 332, 333; see HUTCHINSON, supra note
127, at 89 (stating the penalties "include[d] a fine of five hundred dollars on the master of any
vessel who knowingly brings a contract laborer into the country").
173. See Ngai, supra note 166, at 73-74 (listing the expanding number of groups excluded
under the immigration regulations and describing the border as "soft" and mostly "unguarded").
174. Id. at 74-75.
175. See Kanstroom, supra note 7, at 1909-10 (identifying the Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch.
141, 18 Stat. 477 (repealed 1974) as the first federal immigration law to provide for deportation
as an "immediate part of the exclusion process" because it allowed immigration authorities at the
port of entry to deport prostitutes and persons convicted of non-political crimes); see also Act of
Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084 (providing that any alien who unlawfully entered the
United States could be deported within one year of entry).
176. Alien Contract Labor Law of 1885, ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332 (repealed 1952); Act of Feb.
23, 1887, ch. 220, 24 Stat. 414.
177. Act of Oct. 19,1888, ch. 1210,25 Stat. 566 (repealed 1952); HuTcEtNsoN, supranote
127, at 96.
178. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text (describing the Alien and Sedition
laws).
179. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 11, 26 Stat. 1084, 1086 (superseded by Act ofMar. 3,
1902, ch. 112, §§ 20, 32, 36 Stat. 1213, 1218, 1221 (repealed in 1907)) (requiring that any alien
who entered the country unlawfully be removed within one year "at the expense of the person or
persons, vessel, transportation company, or corporation bringing such alien... and if that can
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a public charge within one year after his arrival," but only if the reason for
deportation arose "from causes existing prior" to entering the country.
80
By the early 1890s, Congress had constructed a patchwork of penalties for
immigration violations that included deportation, incarceration, and fines.'8 1 In
1892, new legislation singled out Chinese citizens unlawfully present in the
United States, imposing imprisonment at hard labor for up to a year. 8 2 All of
these-with the possible exception of fines (which could be both criminal and
civil)--were traditionally considered criminal sanctions.
18 3
In light of these early attempts to enforce immigration law using criminal
penalties, 84 it is not surprising that the first challenges to these immigration
sanctions sought the constitutional protections of a criminal trial. The Supreme
Court faced challenges to this sanctions scheme in two seminal cases. In 1893,
the Court ruled, in Fong Yue Ting v. United States,185 that noncitizens facing
deportation were not entitled to the constitutional safeguards protecting
criminal defendants. 186 Three years later, in Wong Wing v. United States, 187 the
Court ruled that, although immigration authorities could use detention or
temporary confinement "as part of the means necessary to give effect to... the
not be done, then at the expense of the United States").
180. Id.; see Kanstroom, supra note 7, at 1909-11 (distinguishing pre-1907 entry control
measures from the later post-entry grounds for deportation, which he argues became a form of
social control).
181. Kanstroom, supra note 7, at 1900-03.
182. Geary Act of 1892, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25 (repealed 1943).
183. See Markowitz, supra note 127, at 325-27 ("The only historical precedents for
expelling persons from within the nation were transportation, banishment, abjuration of the
realm, and conditional pardons-all of which were imposed only as criminal punishments.");
see also Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228,237 (1896) (recognizing that imprisonment
at hard labor had been considered an infamous punishment for crimes in England and the
Americas since the 1700s); Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 142-43 (2003) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (noting that incarceration became the "centerpiece of correctional theory" around
the nineteenth century, as the use of corporal punishment fell into disrepute).
184. See supra notes 129-80 (discussing early attempts to criminalize immigration
violations).
185. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1898) (holding that
noncitizens facing deportation were not entitled to the constitutional safeguards protecting
criminal defendants).
186. See id. (explaining that because deportation hearings are not criminal proceedings,
certain provisions of the Constitution protecting criminal defendants do not apply); see also
Kanstroom, supra note 7, at 1900-02 (discussing Fong Yue Ting).
187. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896) (ruling that the
commissioner of immigration acted without jurisdiction in sentencing unlawfully present
Chinese citizens to imprisonment at hard labor).
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exclusion or expulsion of aliens," they lacked the power to impose criminal
punishment.1
88
Deportation for causes arising after entry appeared only after the turn of
the century. A 1907 statute mandated deportation of "any alien woman or girl
[found to be a prostitute] ... within three years after" entering the United
States. 8 9 It was the first time that the United States had mandated deportation
of lawful immigrants admitted for permanent residence based on conduct
occurring after entry.'
90
In 1910, Congress struck the three-year limitation, authorizing deportation
of noncitizen women found to be prostitutes at any time after their entry.' 9'
Helena Bugajewitz challenged the constitutionality of the statute as amended,
arguing that it constituted criminal punishment because the conduct for which
she was to be deported was also a crime.192 In Bugajewitz v. Adams,' 93 the
Court held that her deportation was not a criminal punishment despite the
conformity of the facts establishing deportability with facts establishing a crime
under local law.194 Rather, the Court reasoned, it was "simply a refusal by the
government to harbor persons whom it does not want."'1 95
Together, Fong Yue Ting, Wong Wing, and Bugajewitz established that
deportation and criminal punishment were completely distinct sanctions, arising
from unrelated legal authority and governed by different agents: federal
immigration authorities and (primarily) state prosecutors. 96 That separation
188. See id. at 237 ("It is not consistent with the theory of our government that the
legislature should, after having defined an offense as an infamous crime, find the fact of guilt,
and adjudge the punishment by one of its own agents.").
189. Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, § 3, 34 Stat. 898, 900, amended by Act of Mar. 26,
1910, ch. 128, § 2, 36 Stat. 263, 265 (repealed 1917).
190. See Kanstroom, supra note 7, at 1911 (arguing that the 1907 Act nevertheless tied the
post-entry conduct to pre-entry conditions).
191. See Act of Mar. 26, 1910, ch. 128, § 2, 36 Stat. 263,265 (repealed 1917) (stating that
any alien found to be "practicing prostitution after such alien shall have entered the United
States... shall be deemed to be unlawfully within the United States and shall be deported");
DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 125-26 (2007).
192. See Argument for Appellant, Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585,587 (1913) ("The
act involved here is not only attacked because it attempts to exclude aliens, but because it
attempts to delegate to the executive branch of the Government the right to try aliens, and brand
them as criminals, and because they are criminals, to deport them.").
193. See Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913) (holding that Congress has the
power to refuse to harbor persons it does not want).
194. See id. (reasoning that Congress "has power to order the deportation of aliens whose
presence in the country it deems hurtful" without a criminal trial, even when its determination is
based on "facts that might constitute a crime under local law").
195. Id.
196. See Juliet Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Domestication of Immigration Law, 86
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permitted legislators to shape a sanctions scheme for immigration violations
without regard to the existence of criminal sanctions for the same conduct, and
it allowed courts to review deportability challenges divorced from the larger
picture of how deportation and criminal punishment affected the individual
noncitizen.
C. The Rise of Deportation
The 1920s mark the beginning of the prominence of deportation in
immigration law. Having broken the barrier to imposing deportation for post-
entry conduct, deportation legislation began in earnest.1 97 And it began with
the early criminalization of immigration law.
Prior to the 1920s, deportation was rare. 198 Between 1892 and 1907, the
United States deported a few hundred noncitizens annually. 99 The period
between 1908 and 1920 saw a small jump, with 2,000 to 3,000 deported.200
That increase resulted, in part, from post-war legislation in 1917 that authorized
deportation of noncitizens who committed post-entry "crimes of moral
turpitude" and eliminated the statute of limitations for deporting certain aliens
determined to be anarchists. 20 1 The Palmer Raids of 1919 and 1920, during
which the federal government arrested over 10,000 suspected alien anarchists
and deported approximately 500 Eastern European noncitizens, more than
doubled the previous number of annual deportations.
202
N.C. L. REv. 1557, 1580(2008) (explaining that, in combination, the Supreme Court's decisions
on deportation "permit the two greatest powers of the government to be brought to bear on the
noncitizen for the same conduct-the immigration power by the federal government, and the
criminal law by the state or local government").
197. See KANSTROOM, supra note 191, at 133-34 (positing that the 1917 Immigration Act
"radically changed prior law by requiring deportation after entry for a wide variety of reasons
and in permitting deportation without time limitation for certain types of cases").
198. See WILLIAM VAN VLECK, ADMuNISTRATIvE CONTROL OF ALIENS 20 (1932) (explaining
that the 1920s marked "an awakening of public interest" in expulsion and the deportation
process).
199. Ngai, supra note 166, at 74.
200. HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, at 114
(Bicentennial ed. 1975) [hereinafter HISTORICAL STATISTICS]; Ngai, supra note 166, at 74; 1921
INS ANN. REP. 14-15.
201. Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 889 (repealed 1952); see also
Neuman, supra note 129, at 1844 ("In 1917 the federal government also began deporting aliens
from the United States for committing crimes of moral turpitude after their arrival."); Ngai,
supra note 166, at 74 (explaining that Congress gradually extended the statute of limitation on
deportation and eliminated it altogether for certain groups).
202. CHARLES H. MCCORMICK, SEEING REDS: FEDERAL SURVEILLANCEOF RADICALS IN THE
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Immigration legislation passed just prior to the 1920s expanded the
grounds for exclusion.20 3  Nevertheless, the tenacity of the statute of
limitations on deportation204 and the conspicuous absence of entry without
inspection as a ground for deportation205 meant that deportation remained
an extension of exclusion, a way of revoking the admission of excludable
noncitizens. Mae Ngai suggests that at that time "it seemed unconscionable
to expel immigrants after they had settled in the country and had begun to
assimilate. ,206
The early 1920s saw the passage of quota laws for immigrants, ending
the legacy of open immigration from Europe.20 7 Legislation passed in 1924
eliminated the statute of limitations for entering the United States without
authorization, opening the way for deportation on a mass scale.208 Between
1925 and 1929, the number of deportations quadrupled. 2°
The new approach to immigration control continued to employ well-
established enforcement approaches and sanctions, including placing the
onus on third parties to prevent unauthorized immigration. For example,
the quota legislation of the early 1920s expanded the imposition of fines on
transportation companies that imported inadmissible noncitizens.
210
In 1929, legislation that broadened the scope of criminal offenses
leading to deportation solidified the role of deportation as the central
PITrSBURGH MILL DISTRICT, 1917-1921, at 145 (1997); ROBERT K. MURRAY, RED SCARE: A
STUDY IN NATIONAL HYSTERIA, 1919-1920, at 212-17 (1955); MAE NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS:
ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 59 (2004).
203. See Ngai, supra note 166, at 74 (explaining that 1917 legislation added new
"excludable categories" to existing limitations on entry).
204. NGAI, supra note 202, at 59.
205. Ngai, supra note 166, at 74.
206. Id.
207. Quota Law of 1921, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5 (repealed 1952); Immigration Act of 1924, ch.
190, 43 Stat. 153 (repealed 1952); Ngai, supra note 166, at 74-75; see also James F. Smith, A
Nation That Welcomes Immigrants? An Historical Examination of United States Immigration
Policy, 1 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 227, 232 (1995) (explaining that quota laws passed in
the early 1920s significantly decreased the number of Southern and Eastern Europeans who
could enter the United States).
208. Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 14, 43 Stat. 153, 162 (repealed 1952); see also
Ngai, supra note 166, at 76 (describing "a dramatic increase in the number of deportations"
following the passage of the Immigration Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 153).
209. Ngai, supra note 166, at 77; see also HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 200, at 114
(showing an increase in annual deportations from 9,465 to 38,796).
210. Act of May 11, 1922, ch. 187, § 3, 42 Stat. 540, 540; Immigration Act of 1924, ch.
190, § 16, 43 Stat. 153, 163 (repealed 1952). These Acts imposed a "reasonable diligence"
requirement on the companies and increased the fines for noncompliance. § 3, 42 Stat. at 540;
§ 16, 43 Stat. at 163.
1716
FITTING PUNISHMENT
immigration sanction and further intertwined it with criminal sanctions. 2 , 1
The law subjected to deportation all aliens convicted of any offense and
sentenced to two years or more of imprisonment.2 2 It also made unlawful
entry a criminal misdemeanor, punishable by up to one year in jail, a
$1,000 fine, or both.213 A second unlawful entry became a felony, with a
doubling of the sanctions.1 4 Deportation awaited the end of the
sentence.215
The 1929 legislation pioneered the modem immigration sanctions
scheme, employing a range of punitive criminal sanctions paired with
deportation.21 6 Plumbing the full implications of Bugajewitz's holding that
deportation was not a form of punishment,21 7 the statute rendered criminal
what had previously been a purely administrative immigration violation.
Of the 40,000 criminal cases that the U.S. Immigration Service brought
against unlawful entrants between 1929 and 1932, the government
prevailed in 90% of them."1
The 1929 Act held up a mirror to Bugajewitz. Instead of a deportation
statute that overlapped with a state criminal statute, the Act created a
federal crime that mirrored the deportability ground.219 Enforcement of
unlawful entry violations now employed criminal sanctions, in addition to
deportation and fines.220 The criminal conviction also had the effect of
barring future reentry.221  Consistent with Wong Wing 22 2  and
211. Act of Mar. 4, 1929, ch. 690,45 Stat 1551 (repealed 1952); see also HUTCHNSON, supra
note 127, at 208-10 (describing bills considered by the Seventieth Congress to increase the number of
criminal offenses that could lead to deportation and prevent an alien convicted of a crime from being
deported before serving the sentence).
212. Act of Mar. 4, 1929, § 1, 45 Stat. at 1551.
213. Id §2.
214. Id § 1.
215. Id § 3, 45 Stat. at 1552.
216. Id
217. See Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585,591(1913) ('Thedetemination byfucts that might
constitute a crime under local law is not a conviction of crime, nor is the deportation a punishment").
218. NGAI, supra note 202, at 292 n. 14 (citing the VSAnnual Reports forthe years 1929-1932).
219. SeeAct of Mar.4, 1929, ch. 690, §§ 1-2,45 Stat. 1551, 1551 (repealed 1952) (making it a
felony for a deported alien to attempt to reenter the country and providing that any alien who entered
the country unlawfully was guilty of a misdemeanor).
220. See id. § 2 (providing for imprisonment for up to a year of any alien found guilty ofentering
the country unlawfully).
221. Will Maslow, Recasting OurDeportation Law: Proposalsfor Reform, 56 COwm. L. REv.
309,314 (1956).
222. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1986) (ruling that immigration
authorities could use detention as part of the deportation process but that they could not impose
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Bugajewit, 223 those sanctions resulted from two separate proceedings: first
in federal court to try the criminal charge and subsequently as a civil
adjudication to effect removal.224
The 193 Os through the 1960s saw further restrictions on immigration and
the development of flexibility and discretion in imposing deportation and other
sanctions. Depression Era legislation expanded the exclusion of persons likely
to become a public charge.225 Violations of narcotics laws and the fraudulent
use of marriage to obtain legal status became grounds for removal.226
Legislation in the 1940s and 1950s expanded the grounds for deportation,
encompassing conduct occurring prior to the date of the statutes 227 and
requiring deportation of all aliens who unlawfully entered the United States,
including aliens who were not admissible at the time of entry (even those who
had an otherwise valid visa but were nonetheless excludable).228 The Internal
Security Act2 29 expanded the Attorney General's power to detain noncitizens
pending execution of a deportation order.23°
criminal penalties without criminal process).
223. See Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913) (ruling that deportation of an
alien prostitute was not a criminal penalty but "simply a refusal by the government to harbor
persons whom it does not want").
224. See Act of Mar. 4, 1929, § 3, 45 Stat. 1551, 1551 (repealed 1952) (deferring
deportation until the end of imprisonment).
225. HUTCHINSON, supra note 127, at 214.
226. See Act of Feb. 18, 1931, ch. 224, 46 Stat. 1171, 1171 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 156(a)
(2006)) (making violation of narcotics laws grounds for deportation); Act of May 14, 1937, ch.
182, 50 Stat. 164 (repealed 1952) (authorizing the deportation of aliens who fraudulently used
marriage to gain admission to the United States); see also HUTCHINSON, supra note 127, at 220,
242-43 (describing legislation that allowed an alien to be deported if it was found that he or she
violated narcotics laws or used fraudulent marriage to attain entry to the country).
227. See Alien Registration Act of 1940, ch. 439, § 23, 54 Stat. 670, 673 (repealed 1952)
(expanding the grounds for deportation to additional classes of aliens); Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, §§ 208, 241, 66 Stat. 163, 204 (stating that deportation was
permitted even if the deportable offense was committed or the alien entered the United States
prior to the enactment of the law); see also Maslow, supra note 221, at 314 (noting that
legislation during the time period "broadened the deportation powers of the Attorney General"
and expanded the grounds for deportation).
228. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. §§ 101-1537; see also Maslow,
supra note 221, at 314-15 (listing "[t]hose aliens who were excludable at entry but nevertheless
were permitted to enter the country" as one of the general classes of persons to be deported
under the new legislation).
229. Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, § 23, 64 Stat. 987, 1011 (repealed 1993).
230. Id.; see Maslow, supra note 221, at 314 ("The [Internal Security Act] enlarged the




Sanctions other than deportations were also on the rise during this period.
Failure to depart after removal based on grounds of subversive, criminal, or
immoral conduct became a crime carrying the threat of ten years in prison.231
Bars to reentry appeared for noncitizens who had been previously excluded and
deported, 23 2 as well as a ten-year prohibition against naturalization of
noncitizens who associated with the Communist party.233
This more restrictive legislation, however, was accompanied by a move to
expand administrative discretion to grant relief from the harsh consequences of
those laws. The Alien Registration Act allowed the Attorney General to permit
voluntary departure or to suspend deportation of noncitizens of good moral
character when deportation would cause an economic hardship to the
noncitizen's family.234 Although the 1950s saw a narrowing of the Attorney
General's discretion to grant such relief,235 Congress later codified suspension
of deportation in 1962.236 Nevertheless, the expansion of deportation grounds
and the national focus on immigration had its effect: Deportations multiplied,
231. Internal Security Act § 23.
232. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 276, 66 Stat. 163, 229
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(2006)) (establishing criteria for a permanent bar but
providing that an alien could nonetheless apply for reentry with the consent of the Attorney
General); INA § 212(a)(16)-(17), 8 U.S.C. § 1 182(a)(16)-(17) (providing that aliens who have
previously been deported will not be re-admitted without the consent of the Attorney General).
233. Internal Security Act, sec. 25, § 305(a)-(c), 64 Stat. at 1013-14.
234. Alien Registration Act, ch. 439, sec. 20, § 19(c), 54 Stat. 670, 672 (1940); NGAI,
supra note 202, at 87. The current version of suspension of deportation is very narrow. See
INA § 244, 8 U.S.C. § 1254a (listing the five situations when the Attorney General may, "in his
discretion, suspend deportation [of an alien] and adjust the status to that of an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence").
235. See INA §§ 241-244 (broadening deportation powers of the Attorney General, but
prohibiting suspension of deportation or grants of voluntary departure to aliens who fall into
certain categories, including aliens considered subversive, criminal, or immoral, or those who
violated alien registration laws); Maslow, supra note 221, at 314 ("The [Internal Security Act of
1950] enlarged the Attorney General's power to detain aliens and supervise their activities
pending the execution of a deportation order, whereas it narrowed his power to suspend
deportations."); Internal Security Act, sec. 22, § 4(a)-(b), 64 Stat. at 1008 (providing that aliens
deportable under the statute shall "be taken into custody and deported ... unless the Attorney
General is satisfied.., that [the] alien did not know or have reason to believe at the time such
alien became a member of or affiliated with the organization... that such organization was a
Communist organization").
236. See Act of Oct. 24, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-885, sec. 4, § 244(a)(l)-(2), 76 Stat. 1247,
1247-48 (providing for suspension of deportation for aliens who had been present in the United
States for either seven or ten years); HuTcHINSON, supra note 127, at 356 (describing the
legislative history of the Act of Oct. 24, 1962).
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from under 250,000 in the twenty years between 1950 and 1969, to almost
double that number between 1970 and 1989.237
In sum, by the 1980s, immigration sanctions had already undergone
tremendous evolution. Modem immigration law rendered deportation the
ubiquitous sanction, imposed either alone or accompanied by other sanctions
including fines, incarceration, detention, and bars to reentry.
238
D. Crimmigration Law
The modem era of immigration sanctions, beginning in the middle of the
1980s, is marked by a major expansion of immigration sanctions, higher levels
of enforcement, and a narrowing of avenues for the government to exercise
discretionary relief from removal.23 9 This evolution is in no small part due to
the criminalization of immigration law, or "crimmigration law. ' 24  The
development of crimmigration law starkly highlights the lack of proportionality
in immigration law.
This section will describe the legislative transformation of immigration
law through which a multitude of immigration violations began to carry
criminal penalties, and whole categories of crimes became grounds for removal
from the United States. 241 Although immigration law has taken on criminal
enforcement norms, it has not similarly incorporated criminal justice norms.
242
237. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS:
2006, http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/publications/YrBk06En.shtm (follow "Table 38"
hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 21, 2009) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
238. Supra notes 35-53 and accompanying text.
239. See Stumpf, supra note 5, at 369 ("The 1980s saw the beginning of a dramatic
increase in criminal consequences of immigration law violations and deportations of even legal
immigrants convicted of crimes. As Congress swept more immigration-related conduct into the
criminal realm, the executive branch stepped up criminal enforcement of immigration
violations." (citation omitted)).
240. See id. at 376 ("The merger of [immigration law and criminal law] in both substance
and procedure has created parallel systems in which immigration law and the criminal justice
system are merely nominally separate. The criminalization of immigration law, or
'crimmigration law,' has generated intense interest .... ).
241. Kanstroom, supra note 7, at 1892; Miller, supra note 6, at 613; Stumpf, supra note 5,
at 369; see generally Demleitner, supra note 7 (discussing how immigration law has become a
tool of the criminal justice system).
242. Legomsky, supra note 5, at 475. Stephen Legomsky has described the importation of
criminal enforcement norms as having five "ports of entry." These are: (1) the trend toward
immigration violations increasingly carrying criminal penalties, (2) the proliferation of crimes
that now result in removal proceedings, (3) greater application of criminal enforcement theory to
immigration law, (4) importing law enforcement strategies into immigration law, and (5) using
the same actors to enforce both areas of law. Id. at 475-500.
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In particular, criminal justice norms that underlie the framework of criminal
penalties have found no foothold in immigration law. The graduated structure
of criminal punishment, in which penalties tend to be proportionate to the
crime, 243 has no parallel in immigration law.
1. Immigration Violations as Criminal Violations
While earlier immigration violations carried criminal penalties, 244 the
1980s saw the beginning of a vast expansion of criminal penalties in the
245immigration law arena. Traditionally, violating an immigration law resulted
in a civil proceeding to determine whether the noncitizen was subject to
removal from the United States. 246 Now, many immigration violations result in
removal and also carry criminal penalties, and criminal prosecution has more
often become a vehicle for immigration enforcement prior to removal.247
In 1986, Congress provided for imprisonment and criminal fines for a
pattern or practice of knowingly hiring undocumented workers248 and then
created the crime of marrying to evade immigration laws.249 Since then,
Congress has created a host of new immigration crimes, including
entrepreneurship fraud,250 driving at excessive speeds while fleeing an
243. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,287 (1983) ("'[I]t is a precept ofjustice that
punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense. ... '" (quoting Weems
v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910))).
244. See, e.g., Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, sec. 23, § 20(c), 64 Stat. 987, 1012
(mandating that any alien deportable as being subversive, criminal, or immoral and who failed
to depart within six months after being ordered removed was subject to criminal prosecution and
up to ten years in prison); Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No.
90-351, § 1201, 82 Stat. 197, 236 (imposing up to two years of imprisonment on unauthorized
immigrants possessing a gun, on the ground that such aliens posed a threat to the President and
Vice President of the United States).
245. Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of the Post-
September 11th "Pale of Law", 29 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 639,640 (2004); Legomsky,
supra note 5, at 476-82; Miller, supra note 6, at 617.
246. See INA § 237(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2006) (listing categories of removable
noncitizens).
247. Miller, supra note 6, at 639-42; Kanstroom, supra note 245, at 654-55; Stumpf,
supra note 5, at 384; Legomsky, supra note 5, at 476-82.
248. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, sec. 101,
§ 274A(a)(l)-(2), 100 Stat. 3359, 3360 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a).
249. Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, sec. 2(a),
§ 216, 100 Stat. 3537, 3537-41 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
250. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, sec. 121(b)(3), § 275(c), 104 Stat.
4978, 4994 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1325) (defining as a criminal act the establishment of a
commercial enterprise for the purpose of evading immigration laws).
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immigration checkpoint,251 voting in a federal election as a noncitizen,252 falsely
claiming citizenship to obtain a benefit or employment,253 and failing to
cooperate in the execution of one's own removal order.25 4 Concurrently, the
severity of criminal fines and sentence lengths for immigration-related
violations increased dramatically.
255
2. Crimes Resulting in Removal Proceedings
The number and nature of crimes that result in removal proceedings have
proliferated,256 which has enthroned deportation as the central penalty for
immigration violations. Before the mid-1980s, removal of noncitizens for
criminal offenses was largely limited to convictions for serious "crimes of
moral turpitude," drug trafficking, and certain weapons offenses.257 Now, a
251. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub.
L. No. 104-208, § 108, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-557 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 758).
252. Id. §§ 611, 1015(f).
253. Id. § 1015(e).
254. Id. § 1253.
255. See, e.g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, sec. 130001, § 276(b)(1)-(2), 108 Stat. 1796, 2023 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2006))
(increasing criminal penalties from two years to a maximum of ten or twenty years for
unlawfully reentering the United States after deportation or exclusion); Anti-Drug Abuse (Drug
Kingpin) Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, sec. 7345(a)(2), § 276(b)(1)-(2), 102 Stat. 4181,
4471 (increasing the maximum sentence to five to fifteen years for unlawful reentry, depending
upon whether the noncitizen's prior deportation was based on an aggravated felony offense);
Legomsky, supra note 5, at 478-79 ("During the same era in which it has been busily creating
new immigration-related crimes, Congress has been steadily increasing both the fines and the
lengths of the prison sentences for existing immigration-related crimes."); Miller, supra note 6,
at 640 ("The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 increased the criminal penalty for illegal reentry
after deportation or exclusion from up to two years to a maximum of five or ten years ......
(footnote omitted)). Immigration prosecutions are now the largest single type of federal
prosecutions. See TRAC/DHS, Immigration Enforcement, New Findings, http://trac.syr.edu/
tracins/latest/current/ (follow "Figure 6" hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 22, 2009) (revealing that
immigration matters represented 32% of the total number of federal prosecutions in 2004 and
comparing the total to drug and weapons prosecutions) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
256. Legomsky, supra note 5, at 482-86.
257. See HARPER & CHASE, supra note 50, at 612 (defining deportable aliens as members of
the "criminal, subversive, narcotic, or immoral classes"); Miller, supra note 6, at 622
("Although immigration law could, and often did, impose hardships on excludable and
deportable aliens, the regime of the 1960's, 1970's and early 1980's was arguably less punitive
that it is today.").
1722
FITTING PUNISHMENT
crime of moral turpitude carrying a potential sentence of one year is a
removable offense.258
In 1988, Congress created a category of crimes that result in removal from
the United States and dubbed them "aggravated felonies., 259 Originally, this
category included only murder and trafficking in drugs or firearms. 26 As a
result of Congress expanding the list of aggravated felonies in almost every
immigration-related piece of legislation since 1988, the category of aggravated
felonies burgeons with less serious crimes, including misdemeanors.
261
The "aggravated felony" construct is now a misnomer.262 It is neither
limited to felonies, nor descriptive of crimes that conjure the concept of
"aggravated. '263 Nevertheless, conviction of any of the listed crimes almost
invariably results in removal from the United States.264 Because these statutes
258. AEDPA § 435(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). Congress has never defined the
intriguing term "crime involving moral turpitude." There is no shortage of criticism of the use
of this undefined category of crimes as a basis for deportation. See Carter, supra note 47, at
958-59 ("Criticisms of moral turpitude as an undefined concept date back nearly a century.");
Harms, supra note 47, at 259-60 ("For more than a century, the [Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS)] has deported tens of thousands of aliens on the grounds that an
alien was convicted of a 'crime involving moral turpitude.' The INS has done this without any
statutory definition of what constitutes a 'crime involving moral turpitude." (citations
omitted)).
259. Drug Kingpin Act § 101(a)(43), 102 Stat. at 4469.
260. Id.
261. See AEDPA § 241(a)(2)(A)(i)(lI) (making a single crime of "moral turpitude" a
deportable offense); IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (reducing to one year the
sentence length required for a "crime of violence"); Immigration and Nationality Technical
Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416, 108 Stat. 4305 (providing that the term
"aggravated felony" includes offenses such as illicit trafficking in a controlled substance and in
firearms or destructive devices, money laundering, crimes involving explosive materials, theft
crimes for which the penalty is at least five years, racketeering, owning a prostitution business,
and tax evasion); Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (amending and
expanding the list of offenses categorized as aggravated felonies). Examples include
prostitution, acts related to gambling, transportation related to prostitution, alien smuggling,
some forms of document fraud, offenses committed by a previously deported alien, and offenses
related to skipping bail. See Demleitner, supra note 7, at 1065-67 ("So-called 'aggravated
felonies' have begun to constitute an ever larger category of deportable offenses."); Miller,
supra note 6, at 634-35 (discussing federal statutes that "expanded the definition of aggravated
felonies").
262. See Morawetz, supra note 51, at 1939 ("With regard to deportability and eligibility for
relief, the most publicized aspect of the new laws is their Alice-in-Wonderland-like definition of
the term 'aggravated felony."').
263. See id. ("As the term [aggravated felony] is defined, a crime need not be either
aggravated or a felony.").
264. See id. at 1940 ("The importance of the aggravated felony designation for these
convictions is that a single conviction triggers deportability and bars relief from deportation.").
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eviscerated almost every avenue of relief from removal based on an aggravated
felony,265 the number of permanent residents deported for minor crimes has
skyrocketed.266
Widespread application of criminal enforcement theory to immigration
law also has played a part in establishing deportation as the ubiquitous
immigration penalty.267  Grounds for deportation generally fall into two
categories. 268 The first category justifies deportation on the grounds that a
noncitizen should not have been admitted in the first place or violated a
condition of admission to the United States.269 The second category includes
deportations based on post-entry conduct, including post-entry criminal
convictions.27°
265. Id. at 1939-40.
266. See Legomsky, supra note 5, at 485 & n.77 ("Cases in which long-term, lawful
permanent residents have been ordered removed on the basis of seemingly minor offenses that
fit the statutory aggravated felony definition have attracted the attention of commentators and
journalists alike."). In 2004, 92.5% of permanent resident removals were based on criminal
charges. See Markowitz, supra note 127, at 333 n.260 (citing CONG. RESEARCH SERV. REPORT
FOR CONG., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT WITHIN THE UNITED STATES (Apr. 6,2006), available
at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33351.pdf (providing statistics based on reasons for
removal)). In 1988, 5,956 aliens were removed on criminal or narcotics grounds. U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, 1996 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 171
(1997), http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/publications/archive.shtm (follow "1996 Statistical
Yearbook" hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 29, 2009) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). The number of aliens deported on criminal grounds has risen each year--62,108 in
1998; 71,188 in 1999; 73,065 in 2000; 73,545 in 2001; 72,818 in 2002; 82,822 in 2003; 91,508
in 2004; 91,725 in 2005; 97,365 in 2006-with the most recent data for 2007 showing 99,924
deportations based on criminal grounds. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2007 YEARBOOK OF
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 96, 99, 102 (2008), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/
assets/statistics/yearbook/2007/ois_2007_yearbook.pdf.
267. See Legomsky, supra note 5, at 487 (explaining that applying criminal enforcement
theory to immigration law spawned legislation mandating "deporting those who had entered in
violation of the immigration laws").
268. See id. (detailing the two categories of deportation grounds).
269. See INA § 237(a)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A) (2006) (providing that any alien
present in the United States who was inadmissible at the time of entry is subject to deportation);
INA § 237(a)(1)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i) ("Any alien who was admitted as a
nonimmigrant and who has failed to maintain the nonimmigrant status.. . or to comply with the
conditions of any such status, is deportable."); 6 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW
AND PROCEDURE § 71.05(1)(a) (rev. ed. 2007) (providing that "a noncitizen [is] deportable if he
or she [is] convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude"); Legomsky, supra note 5, at 487
(discussing deportation laws that "prescribe deportation for the noncitizen who was properly
admitted but who subsequently violated the conditions that were imposed on him or her at the
time of admission").
270. See NA § 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (providing that an alien who is "convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude within five years ... after the date of admission" and "is convicted of
a crime for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed" is deportable); INA
1724
FITTING PUNISHMENT
Since 1986, there has been a sharp increase in the level of enforcement of
those post-entry deportation grounds, to the extent that they reached 50% of all
deportations in the 1990S.271 Justification for deportation based on this second
category of post-entry conduct, it has been argued, resembles the traditional
justifications for criminal punishment, including deterrence, incapacitation, and
retribution.272
3. Immigration Law Enforcement
The expanded use of preventive detention and the increasing contact
between immigrants and law enforcement personnel have imported elements of
the criminal enforcement model into the immigration sanctions scheme.273
Preventive detention in the immigration context now outstrips its more limited
use in the criminal enforcement model, which largely limits such detention to
the period before trial.274 Since 1988, detention has been mandatory pending a
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) ("Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated
felony at any time after admission is deportable."); INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) ("Any alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a violation
of... any law or regulation... relating to a controlled substance. . ., other than a single
offense involving possession for one's own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is
deportable."); INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(ii) ("Any alien who is, or at any
time after admission has been, a drug abuser or addict is deportable."); INA § 237(a)(3)(A), 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(A) (providing that an alien who fails to comply with federal provisions
regarding notification of change of address is deportable); INA § 237(a)(4)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(4)(A)(ii) (providing that any alien "who has engaged, is engaged, or at any time after
admission engages in... criminal activity which endangers public safety or national security" is
deportable); Legomsky, supra note 5, at 487-88 (discussing federal statutes that "prescribe
deportation for the noncitizen who was promptly admitted but who subsequently violated the
conditions that were imposed on him or her at the time of admission"); Kanstroom, supra note
7, at 1893-94 (discussing the "increasing convergence of deportation and crime control").
271. Legomsky, supra note 5, at 488-89 & nn.92-93.
272. See id. at 514 ("Thirty years ago I argued that the theories of deportation overlapped
substantially, albeit incompletely, with the theories of punishment; it follows, I suggested, that
deportation can sometimes be a form of punishment."); cf Jennifer M. Chac6n, Unsecured
Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control, and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV.
1827, 1832-56 (2007) (making the case that deportation is not retributive because the
punishment does not fit the crime).
273. See Legomsky, supra note 5, at 489 ("Recent years have witnessed the accelerated
incorporation [into immigration law] of several specific attributes of the U.S. criminal
enforcement machinery."); Stumpf, supra note 5, at 391 ("Hand in hand with the greater overlap
between criminal and immigration law and the creation of a police-like enforcement agency has
been the increased use of an immigration sanction-detention-that parallels the criminal
sanction of incarceration.").
274. See 18 U.S.C. § 3141 (2006) (providing for detention of persons pending criminal
trial); Morawetz, supra note 51, at 1946-47 (emphasizing the severity of immigration detention
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removal hearing for noncitizens convicted of an aggravated felony.275 Each
expansion of the aggravated felony grounds, therefore, has increased the
incidence of detention. The grounds for mandatory detention have also
proliferated to include detention of most noncitizens removable on the basis of
a criminal conviction or a connection to terrorism, certain arriving passengers,
and noncitizens under a removal order prior to the removal itself.2 76 The
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has also claimed broad discretionary
power to detain noncitizens for other reasons.277
Moreover, often the same actors enforce both immigration and criminal
law.278 Blessed by federal legislation, 79 state and local law enforcement now
by noting that a person convicted of simple drug possession who was not sentenced to
incarceration faces mandatory detention that can last for several years until the deportation
process is complete). But see Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1387 (10th
Cir. 1981) (finding that detention pending deportation is analogous to incarceration pending
trial and thus is justifiable only as a temporary measure).
275. See Stumpf, supra note 5, at 394 ("Those who have committed aggravated felonies
and have served their prison terms are detained pending the conclusion of deportation
proceedings." (citing Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (upholding a federal statute
mandating preventive detention without bond during immigration proceedings of immigrants
with criminal convictions))).
276. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), 1225(b)(2)(A), 1226(c)(1)(A)-(D) (mandating
detention for asylum seekers, noncitizens not clearly admissible, and noncitizens convicted of
crimes); Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of2001 §§ 411-412,8 U.S.C. §§ 1182,
1189, 1226a (mandating detention for those suspected of terrorism); see also Stumpf, supra
note 5, at 393-94 (discussing the vast "government power to detain noncitizens in the
immigration context").
277. After the events of September 11,2001, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
promulgated a regulation permitting it to detain noncitizens even before filing immigration
charges for a "reasonable" period of time "in the event of an emergency or other extraordinary
circumstance." 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) (2007); see Charles D. Weisselberg, The Detention and
Treatment of Aliens Three Years After September 11: A New New World?, 38 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 815, 825 & n.58 (2005) (noting that prior regulations gave the Immigration and
Naturalization Service twenty-four hours to decide whether to charge a detained alien). DHS
has detained asylum seekers from thirty-three countries with primarily Muslim or Arab
populations. See id. at 829 (describing the detention of asylum-seekers from designated
countries where al Qaeda is present); Donald Kerwin, Counterterrorism andImmigrant Rights
Two Years Later, 80 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1401, 1402-03 (2003) (explaining that these
designated countries are countries in which al Qaeda is present).
278. Legomsky, supra note 5, at 496-500.
279. See INA § 103(a)(10), 8 U.S.C. § 103(a)(10) (empowering state or local law
enforcement with immigration enforcement authority when an "actual or imminent mass influx
of aliens... presents urgent circumstances requiring an immediate Federal response"); INA
§ 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (authorizing the Attorney General to deputize state officers and
employees with authority equivalent to immigration officers); 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a)-(b)
(preempting local laws that prohibit local law enforcement from cooperating with federal
immigration authorities); AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 439, 110 Stat. 1214, 1276 (1996)
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play a substantial role in immigration enforcement,280 joining with the
Department of Justice and the DHS to enforce criminal and civil immigration
laws.281  Federal judges now have authority to order deportation during
(authorizing state and local law enforcement to arrest aliens who are unlawfully present in the
United States because they were previously deported after being convicted of a felony in the
United States); see also Miller, supra note 6, at 637-38 (explaining that prior to enactment of
AEDPA and IIRIRA in 1996, local law enforcement authorities had no authority to arrest aliens
for civil immigration violations); Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority
Position: Why Inviting Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 965, 980 & n.76 (2004) (commenting on precedent allowing broad
application of state power to make immigration arrests).
280. Traditionally, immigration law enforcement was a federal responsibility, a duty of the
sovereign state. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) (declaring that the power to
regulate immigration belongs exclusively to the federal government); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92
U.S. 275,280 (1875) (finding that immigration power belongs to the federal government, not to
the states); Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty and
the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. CiN. L. REV. 1373, 1381 (2006) (noting that courts
largely agree that the federal government has exclusive power over immigration regulation and
have located that power in the Naturalization Clause, the Foreign Affairs Clauses, and the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution along with the sovereign power of the nation); Stumpf,
supra note 196, at 1571 (indicating that concurrent state and federal immigration jurisdiction
"came to an abrupt end" in 1875 when the Supreme Court held that "the federal government's
power of immigration was supreme"); Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement
of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084, 1089 (2004) (stating that "Congress's
extensive regulation of immigration enforcement has preempted, directly or by implication, state
and local arrest authority").
281. In 2002, the Office of Legal Counsel in the U.S. Department of Justice issued a
memorandum reversing a longstanding constitutional interpretation prohibiting state and local
police from enforcing civil immigration laws. Attorney Gen. Prepared Remarks on the Nat'l
Sec. Entry-Exit Registration Sys. (June 6, 2002), http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/speeches/
2002/060502agpreparedremarks.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2009) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review). In 2005, a high level official of the United States Immigration and
Customs Enforcement of the DHS appeared before the House Committee on Homeland Security
and asserted that state enforcement programs were critical to federal efforts to deter criminal
alien activity and threats to national security. Paul M. Kilcoyne, Deputy Assistant Director of
Investigative Services Division, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Dep't of
Homeland Security, 287(g) Program: Ensuring the Integrity of America's Border Security
System Through Federal-State Partnerships, Statement Before the House Comm. on Homeland
Sec. Comm. on Mgmt., Immigration, and Oversight (July 27, 2005), available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/pi/news/testimonies/O50727kilcoyne.pdf. Under DHS, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC), which was
established in 1994 to gather information from databases and provide immigration information
to local police officers, obtained access to additional databases, including the Student and
Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS), National Security Entry-Exit Registration
System (NSEERS), and US Visit. Press Release, Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Homeland Security Supporting Local Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC)
(Aug. 19, 2003), http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?bc= 10234%7C9245 (last visited Aug.
29,2009) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Suzanne Gamboa, New
Immigration Official Supports Local, State Police Help, AsSOCIATED PRESS, July 23, 2003,
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sentencing, though they no longer have the power to prevent deportation.2 2
The embrace of criminal law norms in immigration enforcement has changed
the very character of the immigration sanctions scheme. The importation of
criminal enforcement norms without a corresponding infusion of criminal
justice norms has created a system in which immigration violations based on
criminal conduct have proliferated, but the sanction-removal-has remained
fixed.
Immigration law has evolved from a historical baseline when deportation
was comparatively rare and immigration law imposed a wide variety of
sanctions to the present unremitting application of deportation as the central
immigration sanction. History is not destiny, and this Article does not propose
a return to that earlier time. The history of immigration sanctions is useful
because it illustrates that the current scheme is of relatively recent nascence and
therefore ripe for critique and innovation. Currently, proportionality operates,
at best, at the margins of this scheme. What shape would a properly constituted
immigration sanctions scheme take? The answer depends, to a large extent, on
the overarching goals of immigration law and the purpose of immigration
sanctions. The next section takes up these questions.
IV. A Proposal for a Proportionate Immigration Sanctions Scheme
The project of constructing a proper sanctions scheme for immigration law
is substantial.28 3 The proposal offered in this Article establishes a foundation
http://www.ap.org/ (search "New Immigration Official"; then follow hyperlink for full article)
(last visited Oct. 22, 2009) (explaining that Michael Garcia, then-acting director of the Bureau
of Immigration and Customs Enforcement under the DHS, supported more local law
enforcement involvement in immigration investigations and arrests) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
282. See INA § 238(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c)(1) (2006) ("[A] United States district court
shall have jurisdiction to enter a judicial order of removal at the time of sentencing against an
alien who is deportable, if such an order has been requested by the United States
Attorney.... ."); Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-416, § 224, 108 Stat. 4305, 4322-24 (1994) (authorizing federal judges to order
deportation). As a result, the power of judges to employ immigration sanctions is limited to
imposing more onerous sanctions, but judges are powerless to lighten the immigration sanction
by prohibiting deportation. See Legomsky, supra note 5, at 498 ("[S]entencingjudges have no
power to prohibit deportation."); Taylor & Wright, supra note 9, at 1143 (noting that sentencing
judges seldom exercise this authority, and advocating expansion ofjudicial sentencing power to
determine whether to deport noncitizens).
283. I am, of course, not the first to advocate an overhaul of the deportation system. See
Kanstroom, supra note 87, at 209 (proposing a "legitimacy grid" to determine deportability
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on which to build. As a first step, I will seek to apply the proposed sanctions
scheme to noncitizens who were in lawful status at the time they violated
immigration law-namely, legal permanent residents and temporary visa
holders (nonimmigrants). I confine the analysis to two illustrative immigration
violations: commission of a crime and violation of a condition of entry.
A. Major Elements of an Immigration Sanctions Scheme
The INA relies heavily on the inadmissibility and deportability grounds to
determine whether to remove a noncitizen from the United States.284 In theory,
grounds for inadmissibility and deportability identify undesirable characteristics
or conduct of noncitizens that are significant enough to impose an immigration
sanction. Examples of such grounds include commission of certain crimes,
285
immigration-related fraud and improper use of documents,286 public health
concerns, 287 and violations of the conditions of a nonimmigrant visa.2 88 This
Article does not critique the substance of those grounds. Instead, it evaluates
whether those grounds and the sanctions associated with them incorporate
proportionality and sufficiently account for other factors such as the reason for
admission and the value to the United States of the noncitizen's continued
presence. A properly calibrated sanctions scheme should incorporate not only
undesirable characteristics and conduct but also the egregiousness of the
using immigration status and the function of the deportability ground "embellish[ed] with other
factors.., such as length of residence, legality of status, claims of hardship, potential eligibility
for permanent residence or citizenship, or family ties. On the horizontal, one might measure:
retroactivity, weight of the government interest to deport for a particular reason, the reason for
selective enforcement, etc.").
284. See NA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (listing inadmissibility grounds); INA § 237(a),
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (listing deportability grounds); INA § 240a, 8 U.S.C. 1229a (describing
removal proceedings and reliance on inadmissibility and deportation grounds to determine
removal).
285. See INA § 212(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (listing classes of aliens ineligible for
visas or admission as a result of criminal and related grounds); INA § 237(a)(2), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2) (listing classes of aliens deportable for criminal offenses).
286. See NA § 212(a)(6)-(a)(9), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)-(a)(9) (listing classes of aliens
ineligible for visas or admission as a result of fraud and improper use of documents); INA
§ 237(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(3) (listing deportation grounds based on document fraud and
falsification of documents).
287. See INA § 212(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1) (listing classes of aliens ineligible for
visas or admission on health-related grounds).
288. See INA § 237(a)(1)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1127(a)(1)(C)(i) (defining as deportable any
alien who has failed to maintain nonimmigration status or failed to "comply with the conditions
of any such status"); INA § 237(a)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C) (listing deportability
grounds for violating nonimmigrant status).
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violation, the values reflected in the admissions categories, and the ties that the
noncitizen has to the United States.
First, taking into account the seriousness of the violation would bring
immigration law into line with the proportionality principle that underlies
criminal punishment.289  The criminalization of immigration law has
highlighted the striking disparity between the proportionality norms that
animate criminal punishment and the lack of such proportionality in
immigration law. In criminal law, the norm that the punishment should fit the
crime flows from the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment.290 This has resulted in a system reflecting a range of
incarceration terms, as well as suspended sentences, parole, criminal fines, and
community service requirements.29' Importing a proportionality norm into the
immigration sanctions scheme would result in a spectrum of severity, imposing
lighter sanctions for lesser violations and harsher sanctions for more serious
violations.
Second, constructing an immigration sanctions scheme requires examining
the underlying goals of immigration law and the role of sanctions in furthering
those aims. The central aims of immigration admissions are usually described
as twofold: facilitating family reunification and ensuring an adequate labor
supply for the U.S. economy.292 The admissions categories of the INA embody
293these aims. Most of the admissions categories require either a relationship
with a close family member294 or a showing that the noncitizen would
contribute to the U.S. economy without undermining job opportunities for
American workers.
295
289. See Roozbeh (Rudy) B. Baker, Proportionality in the Criminal Law: The Differing
American Versus Canadian Approaches to Punishment, 39 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 483,
487 (2008) (describing the proportionality standard required by the Eighth Amendment).
290. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
291. See USSG § 5A (2006) (setting out graduated sentences depending on the nature of
the offense and differing sets of facts).
292. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 56, at 297 (describing these categories).
293. See INA § 203, 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (describing the various admissions categories within
the Immigration and Nationality Act).
294. See NA § 201(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (defining admissions category
of "immediate relatives" of United States citizens); INA § 203(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (defining
admissions preferences for sons, daughters, and siblings of U.S. citizens and close relatives of
lawful permanent residents); INA § 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K) (defining
nonimmigrant admissions category for fiancds of U.S. citizens); INA § 101(a)(15)(N), 8
U.S.C.§ 1 101(a)(15)(N) (defining nonimmigrant admissions category for parents, siblings, and
children of "special immigrant[s]").
295. See INA § 203(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b) (establishing admissions preferences for
employment-based immigrant visas); INA § 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (defining
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The admissions categories reflect complex legislative priorities about the
relative value of individual noncitizens. The family reunification categories
prioritize parents, spouses, and minor children of U.S. citizens over older sons
and daughters, and the spouses and minor children of permanent residents over
the siblings of U.S. citizens. 296  Employment-based immigrant categories
prioritize aliens who demonstrate "extraordinary ability" in the sciences, the
arts, business, or athletics over noncitizens with baccalaureate degrees, and
baccalaureate degree holders over skilled and unskilled workers.2 97
An immigration sanctions scheme should account for the value to the
nation of the noncitizen's admission that is reflected in this multilayered
prioritization of the reasons for admissions. Reasonable minds could disagree
as to whether these legislative priorities are the right ones, or whether they
accurately reflect the relative value of any individual noncitizen or group of
noncitizens, if such a valuation is ever possible. Nonetheless, the admissions
categories at least provide a readily available reference point for evaluating the
potential benefit to the United States of admitting a particular class of
noncitizens.
The weight that an admission category should have in assessing a sanction
for an immigration violation will vary based on immigration status and the
reason for admission. Whether the noncitizen is a temporary visitor or legal
permanent resident, or whether admission was based on a close family
connection or on winning the admissions "lottery" may affect the type of
sanction or its severity.
298
Finally, inherent in the granting of admission to noncitizens is the
foreseeable likelihood that they will acquire ties to U.S. residents and
communities. Admitting noncitizens, even for temporary purposes, raises the
possibility that they will become embedded in families, social networks,
communities, and workplaces. These post-admission ties, and the disruption
numerous nonimmigrant categories permitting temporary entry for business and employment).
296. Compare NA § 201(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (exempting "immediate
relatives" of U.S. citizens from immigration quotas), with INA § 203(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)
(setting quotas and preferences for unmarried sons and daughters of U.S. citizens less than
twenty-one years old (first preference), spouses and children of legal permanent residents
(second preference), married sons and daughters of U.S. citizens (third preference), and siblings
of U.S. citizens (fourth preference)).
297. See INA § 203(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b) (setting out preference categories that privilege
noncitizens with greater talents and skills and higher levels of education over other noncitizen
applicants for employment-based visas).
298. One pathway to permanent immigration status is by winning a diversity visa in the
world-wide lottery for U.S. immigrant visas. See INA § 203(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(c) (defining
diversity immigrants).
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that removal or other sanctions could visit on the noncitizen's family, employer,
or community, should inform the decision of whether to remove the noncitizen
or to apply an alternative sanction that conforms more closely to the purpose of
immigration law.299 The noncitizen's citizenship status, length of stay, and
events occurring after entry will heavily influence this element.
The current emphasis on deportation as the consistent response to
violation of any immigration provision falls short in several respects. First, as
this Article has argued, assigning deportation as the ubiquitous sanction renders
it impossible to calibrate the gravity of the violation with the size of the
sanction. 300 Second, the current scheme ignores the values underlying the
admission of the individual noncitizen. It fails to account for the prioritization
evident in the admissions scheme for evaluating the benefit of admitting and
retaining the noncitizen. 30' Thus, a noncitizen admitted as a permanent
resident, as an alien who has demonstrated "extraordinary ability" in science
through evidence of "sustained national or international acclaim," is subject
largely to the same deportability grounds as a tourist visa holder.30 2 Finally,
except for limited forms of relief, the emphasis on deportation inadequately
accounts for post-entry acquisition of family, community, and workplace ties.
A well-constructed sanctions scheme should incorporate all of these elements.
B. A Proposal: Introducing Proportionality into Immigration Law
In sum, a proportionate system of sanctions for immigration violations
should consider: (1) the gravity of the violation, taking into account the nature
of the violation and any consequences, (2) the benefit to the United States of
imposing the proposed sanction and, conversely, any harm to the United States,
the noncitizen, or others resulting from its imposition, and (3) the stake that the
noncitizen has in remaining in this country.
299. This element of a properly constructed sanctions scheme dovetails with a theory of
immigration law that Hiroshi Motomura has articulated as "immigration as affiliation." HiROSHI
MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF LMMIGRATION AND CmzENsHIP IN THE
UNITED STATES 89 (2006). The theory arises from modem immigration law's focus on ties to
the United States as a factor in determining the strength of constitutional rights for noncitizens.
Id. As ties and obligations to a new country increase, and with those a sense of belonging,
government power over the noncitizen wanes and the power of individual rights expands. Id.
300. See supra Part lI.A (discussing the lack of proportionality in immigration sanctions).
301. Id.
302. See INA § 203(b)(l)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(l)(A) (describing the first-preference
employment-based permanent admissions category). The permanent resident would have
greater access to relief from deportation. See supra notes 62-86 and accompanying text
(discussing forms of relief, including those that apply to lawful permanent residents).
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This multi-factor analysis results in a spectrum of sanctions. When the
immigration violation is relatively minor, the reason for admitting the
noncitizen is still compelling, and the noncitizen has strong ties to the country
such that her stake in remaining is great, the sanction should be lighter. When
the immigration violation is egregious, the rationale for admission is weak
(either because of the violation or due to other circumstances) and the
individual has few ties to the United States (and thus little stake in remaining)
the sanction should be heavier. I analyze below how this framework plays out
at two points along the spectrum of immigration violations: commission of
crimes and violation of a term or condition of entry to the United States.
1. Commission of a Crime
Consider two noncitizens, both of whom have recent convictions for
possession of cocaine. Both have served six month sentences, and the
government now seeks to remove them on the basis of their convictions. °3 One
is a lawful permanent resident3 °4 and the other holds a B-1 visa authorizing
temporary travel for business for a period of six months to a year.30 5 The
permanent resident was admitted as a spouse of a U.S. citizen, and now has a
U.S. citizen child. The business traveler is in the United States to make a series
of presentations on new management practices at business conferences around
the nation. Under current law, both are equally removable based on the
deportability ground for conviction of any drug offense, as no relief from
deportation is available for drug crimes regardless of the immigration status of
the noncitizen. °6
303. See INA § 237(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B) ("Any alien who at any time after
admission has been convicted of a violation of... any law or regulation... relating to a
controlled substance ... is deportable.").
304. Lawful permanent residents are subject to the criminal deportability grounds. See
INA § 237(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (indicating that the criminal deportability grounds make
most forms of relief unavailable to noncitizens); INA § 232(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (denying
waiver of certain grounds of inadmissibility to permanent residents with aggravated felony
convictions); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, § 304 (prohibiting cancellation of removal for permanent residents with
aggravated felony convictions, as defined by INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(43)); INA
§ 240B (curtailing voluntary departure for aliens with aggravated felony convictions).
305. SeelNA§ 101(15)(B),8U.S.C. § 1101(15)(B) (pertaining to aliens who are visiting
the United States for business or travel with no intention of abandoning their foreign
residences); 22 C.F.R. § 41.31 (b)(1) (authorizing issuance of business visa for "conventions,
conferences, consultations, and other legitimate activities of a commercial or professional
nature").
306. See INA § 237(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B) (indicating that any alien convicted
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Applying the sanctions analysis proposed above, the criminal penalty
imposed for the drug conviction is likely a sufficient sanction for the permanent
resident. The first element addresses the gravity of the violation and the
proportionality of the sanction. For both noncitizens, that determination largely
duplicates the function of the criminal sentence in measuring the egregiousness
of the circumstances surrounding a crime and its harm to society. In theory, the
criminal sentence functions to incapacitate the offender, deter others from
similar conduct, and exact retribution for society. °7 Using the criminal
sentence to fulfill the same goals that underlie deportation has precedent in the
use of concurrent sentences in criminal law.
The second element, the benefit or cost to the United States of imposing
the sanction, favors alternatives to deportation for both noncitizens, though
more strongly for the permanent resident. The benefit to the United States of
deporting a noncitizen for a drug offense for which a criminal sentence has
already been served is arguably twofold: deterring other noncitizens from
committing drug crimes and incapacitating the noncitizen from repeating the
offense in the United States. Another way to articulate this benefit is
expressive: Deportation expresses the United States' approbation of the
violation of its norms by noncitizens. For the permanent resident, deportation
signals that U.S. citizenship is available only to those who obey the rules.
How strongly these benefits weigh in favor of the sanction of deportation
depends on the strength of the proposition that noncitizens admitted to the
United States should be held to a higher standard than citizens. That
proposition views nonimmigrants-like our business traveler-as guests who
should be on their best behavior and lawful permanent residence as a
probationary period.30 8 Within that view, violating criminal law evidences a
of violating a law relating to a controlled substance is deportable). The single exception under
this ground does not apply. See id. (excepting convictions for possession of less than thirty
grams of marijuana). For a cogent critique of the drug inadmissibility grounds, see Nancy
Morawetz, Rethinking Drug Inadmissibility, 50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 163, 163 (2008) (arguing
for "changes to the immigration law that would better reflect societal standards with respect to
the appropriate lifetime consequences of past drug use").
307. See Maria Isabel Medina, The Criminalization of Immigration Law: Employer
Sanctions and Marriage Fraud, 5 GEO. MASON L. REv. 669, 717 (1997) (describing the
traditional justifications for imposing criminal penalties as retribution, deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation) (citing Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2)(2)); Legomsky, supra note 5, at 474 ("[C]ompared to the civil regulatory model,
the criminal justice model places greater emphasis on retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation
and less emphasis on rehabilitation and redemption."); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW
§ 7. 1(c) (4th ed. 2003) (discussing the various theories of punishment including incapacitation,
deterrence, and retribution).
308. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 586-87 (1952) ("Under our law, the
alien in several respects stands on an equal footing with citizens, but in others has never been
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repudiation of our society's most strongly-held values, °9 so noncitizens who
commit crimes are fundamentally unfit to continue to reside among us.
While this perspective has merit, it has weakened with the expanded reach
of crimmigration law. As a larger set of minor crimes and nonviolent crimes
have come to constitute violations of immigration law-including
misdemeanors 3 '-the argument that these crimes render a permanent resident
unfit to remain in our society loses traction.
These benefits, moreover, are outweighed by considerable costs to the
United States. The harm to the United States in imposing deportation on this
permanent resident lies in breaking up an American family.31' The deportation
sanction reverses the family reunification goal underlying many of the
admissions categories, expressed here through the grant of permanent residence
based on marriage to an American spouse.312 Although one might argue that
the cocaine conviction decreases the permanent resident's value to the family,
that value will vary based on the individual circumstances and calls for a more
nuanced inquiry than current law permits.
The harm to the United States of deporting the business traveler is less
compelling. The cost to the United States is the loss to certain business
conference audiences of potentially valuable management expertise, and the
potential for increased economic advantage resulting from the business
opportunities that the B-i visa holder's presence in the United States can
create. The circumstances of these hypothetical noncitizens, of course,
illustrate only one facet of the potential harm to the United States of imposing
the deportation sanction. Deportation of other permanent residents and
nonimmigrant visa holders may leave employers without an employee critical to
their operations, or lead to the loss of a community member who had performed
valuable services for others. At bottom, there are costs to the United States in
failing to retain a member of the community who, despite the crime, has
contributed to society and appears likely to continue to do so.
conceded legal parity with the citizen .... [T]o protract this ambiguous status ... is not his
right but is a matter of permission and tolerance."). But see id. at 599 (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(asserting that "[a]n alien, who is assimilated in our society, is treated as a citizen so far as his
property and his liberty are concerned").
309. Id. at 587-88.
310. See supra note 51-53 (providing examples of minor crimes and misdemeanors
resulting in deportation of noncitizens).
311. Similarly, deporting a permanent resident admitted as an employee deprives an
employer of a member of its workforce valuable enough to successfully pursue an often
expensive, intensive and time-consuming admission application.
312. See INA § 203(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (describing the "preference allocation for
family-sponsored immigrants").
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In addition to weighing the cost of imposing deportation on the United
States, the noncitizen, and other United States persons, the cost to those outside
the United States is a factor. Employing alternatives to removing noncitizens,
particularly permanent residents, takes seriously the role that our society may
have played in creating the circumstances leading to the commission of the
crime.313 If a permanent resident's criminal conduct is in any part a result of
exposure to flaws in our society, removing that individual imposes on another
country the risk of recidivism. Alternatives to deportation in the case of long-
term permanent residents and others who were raised in this country is a way
for the United States to take responsibility for a situation that arose within its
borders, rather than exporting the issue to another country.
The third element concerns the noncitizen's stake in the United States.
Stake is inherent in the status of permanent residency. Lawful permanent
residents occupy the highest rung in the hierarchy of alienage status, and
permanent resident status is a mandatory prerequisite to naturalization. 314 As
potential citizens, immigration law invests permanent residents with a status
that is stable enough to encourage tie-formation, as family relationships,
employment, social relationships, cultural and community integration, and other
innumerable forms of investment in residing in the nation.
In contrast, the business traveler holds comparatively little stake in
remaining in the United States. The length of the visa term provides much less
opportunity to establish significant ties in the United States. The only real stake
in remaining in the country is to complete the series of presentations, a
relatively slight interest.
Considering all three elements together, the imposition of the criminal
sentence should normally subsume the immigration sanction within the
criminal penalty, at least for permanent residents. A particularly egregious
crime with circumstances suggesting seriously reprehensible conduct may
require imposing the deportation sanction, especially when the permanent
resident immigrated recently and has few ties in the United States.3"' A less
313. See Daniel Kaustroom, Post-Deportation Human Rights Law: Aspiration, Oxymoron,
or Necessity?, 3 STAN. J. Ctv. RTs. & Clv. LIBERTIES 195, 210 (2007) (analyzing statistics
showing higher crime rates among native-born citizens than foreign-born immigrants and
concluding "it is not immigrants that cause violent crime, so much as living in the United
States").
314. See INA § 316(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (mandating that "[n]o person.., shall be
naturalized unless such applicant,... immediately preceding the date of filing his application
for naturalization has resided continuously, after being lawfully admitted for permanent
residence, within the United States for at least five years").
315. Permanent residents who immigrate based on employment under INA § 203(b) are
more likely to immigrate without ties than those who immigrate as a family member under
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compelling case for an alternative to deportation can be made for the business
traveler than for the permanent resident because all three elements are weaker
for the business visa holder. For both, however, the deterrent, incapacitating,
and retributive effect of deportation is largely accomplished through the
criminal sentence, and deportation would undo the benefits that underlay the
initial admissions decision.316
In some circumstances, complete reliance on the criminal sanction will not
adequately address the particular concerns that a criminal conviction committed
by a noncitizen raises. Two rationales may underlie the current practice of
imposing deportation on top of the criminal sentence: (1) expressing societal
disapproval of criminal conduct by noncitizens and (2) addressing a concern
that the noncitizen's conduct renders questionable her fitness to join the U.S.
citizenry (for the permanent resident) or remain within U.S. society (for the
business traveler).1 7 Sanctions proportionate to the immigration violation and
which addresses these rationales, without rising to the level of deportation, are
within reach. These include restricting or delaying access to immigration
benefits, imposing probation-like conditions or requiring community service,
higher application fees for immigration benefits, or attending remedial courses
on citizenship preparedness. For example, extending the time before which a
permanent resident could apply for citizenship would address the concern that
the permanent resident's conduct reflects poorly on her fitness to join the
citizenry and would balance that concern with the harm that deportation would
impose on the permanent resident and others.3 18 Implementing probation in the
context of immigration enforcement would involve retaining the noncitizen in
§ 203(a). 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b), § 1153(a). Nevertheless, employment itself can constitute a
strong attachment and cannot be discounted.
316. See Stumpf, supra note 5, at 402 ("[T]he rapid importation of criminal grounds into
immigration law is consistent with a shift in criminal penology from rehabilitation to harsher
motivations: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and the expressive power of the state.").
317. Another rationale may be to incapacitate the noncitizen from committing similar
crimes within the United States. As suggested above, the criminal justice system addresses the
desire to incapacitate.
318. To some extent, the current system already imposes this sanction. Conviction of
certain crimes renders a permanent resident unable to establish the "good moral character"
required to naturalize. Aggravated felony convictions amount to a permanent bar on
naturalization. See INA § 316(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (defining good moral character); INA
§ 101(f)(8), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(0(8) (establishing the aggravated felony bar). Crimes involving
moral turpitude, on the other hand, bar a finding of good moral character until five years after
the offense was committed. See INA §§ 1427(a), 1101(0(3) (establishing the five-year bar).
However, since the penalty for conviction of either category of crime is removal, this delay
before eligibility for naturalization cannot be treated as a form of graduated immigration
sanction.
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the community under conditions set by the court or agency including
supervision. Violation of those conditions may lead to deportation.
2. Violation of Conditions of Entry
In contrast to crimes, a noncitizen who violates a condition of entry (other
than through criminal conduct) has transgressed pure immigration law. In this
arena, there is generally no external remedial framework like criminal
sentencing that takes the first crack at a sanction. Instead, the primary approach
to violations of the terms and conditions of a visa is the all-or-nothing
application of the deportation sanction.319 Two examples provide fodder for the
proposed analysis: first a student who works more than the hours that her visa
permits, 320 and second, an employee in the United States on a temporary basis
321whose spouse works without employment authorization.
The first element of the proposed sanctions scheme, the gravity of the
violation, does not weigh in favor of a heavy sanction for either the student or
the spouse. The nature of this sort of violation does not, on its face, seem so
grave as to render the noncitizen unfit to remain in the United States. It is
difficult to conclude that the student who works more than her allotted hours is
morally reprehensible. The same is true of the working spouse of an employee
on a temporary visa.
The second element provides more traction for an argument in favor of
deportation. The government permitted the noncitizen to enter the United
States temporarily with the understanding that she would comply with
established rules.322 The benefit to the United States of deportation is that it
imposes retribution: When a visitor breaks those rules, it seems justifiable for
the government to revoke permission to remain.323 Deportation also
incapacitates the noncitizen from taking jobs or work hours that authorized U.S.
319. See INA § 237(a)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C) (establishing as grounds for
removal the failure to comply with any condition of nonimmigrant status).
320. See INA § 101(a)(15)(F)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(15)(F)(i) (providing that a student
who works more hours than her visa allows is subject to deportation).
321. See INA § 237(a)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1127(a)(1)(C) (establishing as grounds for
removal the failure to comply with any condition of nonimmigrant status). For example,
spouses of highly skilled employees bearing H-lB visas generally do not have authorization to
work. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(9)(iv).
322. See INA § 237(a)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C) (establishing as grounds for
removal the failure to comply with any condition of nonimmigrant status).




employees could fill. There may also be a deterrent effect on other noncitizens
considering unauthorized employment or fraudulently seeking to obtain
nonimmigrant visas in order to work without authorization.324 If such
violations are difficult to enforce, perhaps a strict sanction such as deportation
is necessary to provide deterrence.
That risk, however, is to be weighed against the benefits of withholding
deportation, along with the retributive and deterrent potential of other
sanctions. When removing the noncitizen would undermine the purpose for
granting entry or impose other costs on the United States, the noncitizen, or
others, these costs often will outweigh the retributive benefit of deportation.
Deporting the spouse of an employee on a temporary visa will, at a minimum,
impact the quality of the employee's work. It may lead the employee to depart
with her spouse, leaving the U.S. employer without a valuable employee.
Deporting the student deprives both student and school of the student's
participation in the intellectual life of the institution.325
The element of stake in the United States is less compelling for a
noncitizen in a temporary immigration status than for the permanent resident.
Still, temporary residents often have strong interests in remaining in the United
States. These might include the opportunity to complete a degree or the interest
in staying with a spouse on a work visa.326 Stake in the United States is still
more compelling for those temporary visa holders, such as H-i B workers, who
have a pathway to permanent residence.327
When, as in these examples, the violation is minor, the costs of deporting
a noncitizen outweigh the benefits (especially by thwarting the reason for
admission), and the noncitizen continues to have a stake in remaining,
alternatives to deportation are appropriate. Imposing fines or a probationary
324. See, e.g., Jessica M. Vaughn, Verification of Employment Authorization: Federal
Basic Pilot Program is an Effective and Employer-Friendly Tool for Immigration Law
Compliance, Feb. 21, 2006, http://www.cis.org/articles/2006/jmvtestimony022106.html (last
visited Sept. 29, 2009) (providing information from a study suggesting that a federal program
known as "Basic Pilot" would deter illegal aliens from seeking jobs at participating employers)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
325. Not to mention the lost tuition.
326. See INA § 203(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (describing the "preference allocation for
family-sponsored immigrants").
327. Several temporary employment-based visas open the way to permanent resident status.
See INA § 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) (establishing the H-lB visa
which allows temporary employment visas for aliens in a specialty occupation); INA
§ 101(a)(15)(E)(i)-(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(15)(E)(i)-(ii) (establishing the E visa which allows
temporary employment visas for aliens to enter the United States under a trade treaty); INA
§ 101(a)(15)(L), 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(15)(L) (establishing the L visa which allows temporary
employment for an alien as a manager or executive).
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delay before acquiring a more permanent status would satisfy retributive
concerns and have a deterrent effect,328 as would incarceration in cases where
the violation is egregious but the costs of deportation outweigh its benefits.
Establishing a probationary delay is not without precedent, and could follow the
lines of the already-existing stay of removal329 or deferred action on
enforcement of removal. 330 A final option is a determination of deportability
with a stay of removal. 331 This option is parallel to the suspended sentence in
criminal sentencing,332 but with an added level of deterrence due to the
noncitizen's interest in remaining in the country.
The remedial scheme proposed in this Article ideally would encourage
development and application of sanctions beyond the binary decision of
whether to impose deportation. The proposal is not without its faults.
Restricting the applicability of deportation may risk undermining deterrence of
some immigration violations. The ingredients of the proposed analysis call for
an individualized response to the violation. That has the potential to undermine
uniformity of decisionmaking about immigration violations and the ability of
the government to provide notice to noncitizens about what conduct is expected
of them. Nevertheless, the sanctions scheme this Article proposes would allow
immigration remedies to hew more closely to the purposes for admitting
noncitizens to the United States, whether temporarily or permanently.
328. See Secure America and Orderly Immigration Act, S. 1033, 109th Cong. § 304(2005)
(proposing, inter alia, imposition of a fine for undocumented immigrants to obtain lawful
status).
329. See 8 U.S.C § 1252(b)(3)(B) (permitting a stay of removal during deportation
proceedings).
330. See David A. Martin, On Counterintuitive Consequences and Choosing the Right
Control Group: A Defense of Reno v. AADC, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 363, 368 (2000) (listing
administrative measures to delay removal).
331. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3)(B) (permitting a stay of removal during deportation
proceedings).
332. See 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 2147 (2009) ("Generally, courts have the ability to
suspend sentences, or to stay criminal proceedings when such a stay will accommodate the ends
ofjustice. In addition, the jurisdiction to grant probation and deal with probation matters lies




Deportation is a relative newcomer to the immigration sanctions
structure.333 It has become, however, a ubiquitous presence in immigration
enforcement.334 The pressure on legislators to impose more numerous and
harsher sanctions has increased. 335 The criminalization of immigration law has
fostered a public perception connecting immigrants with criminal conduct.336
These pressures make it difficult, if not impossible, to legislate thoughtfully a
proportionate immigration sanctions scheme when there is a risk that the public
would perceive such innovation as a failure of immigration enforcement.
Nonetheless, the impracticality and inequity of the current singular reliance on
deportation calls out for reform.
In outlining the skein of a remedial scheme for immigration, the
underlying purposes of our immigration laws have come to the fore as a
significant factor in shaping consequences for violations of those laws.
However, the Article leaves unanswered important questions about how to put
meat on the bones of the proposed scheme. More work is necessary to
delineate which alternative sanctions should apply and under what
circumstances. I also leave unaddressed who would be responsible for
undertaking such a project. These are topics that I plan to explore in
subsequent writings, building on the foundation laid here. At bottom, however,
the proposal seeks to advance the national conversation about immigration by
drawing attention to the role of sanctions in establishing a more just and more
effective legal framework for immigration law.
333. See supra Part III.C (describing the history of deportation in the United States).
334. See Stumpf, supra note 5, at 383 (describing Congress's expansion of crimes leading
to deportation).
335. See, e.g., Emily Bazar, Strict Immigration Law Rattles Oklahoma Businesses,
USATODAY.coM, Jan. 10, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-01-09-immig
cover N.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2009) (noting that state legislatures "have adopted measures
aimed at curbing illegal immigration," partly in response to pressure from their constituencies)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
336. See Miller, supra note 6, at 617-18 (noting that the phrase "criminalization of
immigration law" fails to adequately capture the creation of a new system of social control that
includes both immigration and criminal justice, but which is purely neither).
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